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PREFACE

A variation on an old adage states, "things aren't like they used to be and
never were." The applicability of tax law to higher education is a subject
to which the modified adage is apt. If there was ever a time when tax law
was generally inapplicable to higher education, when higher education
administrators and counsel could ignore the maddening and glorious detail
of tax law, it is certainly not now and one would be hard pressed to prove

* General Counsel, Columbia College Chicago, 1995-present. Associate General Counsel,
University of Florida, 1992-1995. J.D., University of Florida, 1986. LL.M (Tax), University of
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that such a time ever existed. Indeed, many of modem tax law's
prohibitions and allowances were motivated by or refined as a result of
college and university functions occurring more than fifty years ago. The
most famous example, of course, is New York University's tax free operation
of a pasta manufacturing company,1 which will be forever associated with
the enactment of the unrelated business income tax2 and the prohibition
against "feeder organizations." 3 The "integral part" doctrine, which is so
prominent in modem tax jurisprudence, was formulated in response to the
operation of a bookstore by a public institution in Washington.4 Hence, at
least with regard to tax jurisprudence's application to colleges and
universities, history proves that the good old days probably never were.
The small consolation in the modified adage is that the present is not all
that different from the past. Which, in this context, is to say that the present
is not as bad as we tend to believe with respect to tax oversight of college
and university operations. Nowhere is this consolation more in need of
repeating than within the ivy covered walls of academic health centers
(sometimes referred to herein as "health centers"). In their efforts to adapt
to the managed care environment, health center administrators and their
counsel are having to become proficient or at least conversant in tax
jurisprudence previously consulted on rare occasions. Administrators and
counsel might rightly long for bygone days when they nurtured a healthy
and blissful ignorance with respect to the tax code's applicability to colleges
and universities. But academic health center administrators are responding
to changes in the business of health care with business strategies designed,
like all business strategies, to obtain or maintain a stronger grasp on
revenue. Revenue and the means by which it is obtained is the whole
concern of tax law. In light of that reality, health center administrators
necessarily invoke and must negotiate the requirements of tax law as part
of their efforts to confront managed care.
This article discusses and analyzes tax provisions applicable to operating
strategies employed by academic health centers adapting to the managed
care environment. The article begins by identifying the traditional
characteristics of academic health centers and how those characteristics

1. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
2. I.R.C. §§ 511-13 (1994). All references are made to the 1986 Tax Code as amended to
date.
3. I.R.C. § 502 (1994).
4. Squires v. Student Books, 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951). The "integral part" doctrine
was most recently discussed in a case involving the Tax Court's denial of tax exempt status to
a wholly-owned subsidiary created by the State University of New York. University Medical
Resident Services, P.C. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3130 (1996). Other contemporary
cases involving tax oversight of college and university operations include Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (concerning the definition of the term
"charitable"); John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 USTC (CCH) 19514 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(concerning the prohibition against private inurement) and Iowa State University v. United
States, 500 F.2d 508 (Ct.Cl. 1974) (concerning the unrelated business income tax).
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conflict with the principles of managed care. The various operating
strategies designed to resolve the conflicts, including primary care physician
recruitment, primary care practice acquisitions, joint operating agreements,
joint ventures and tax exempt health maintenance organizations, are then
discussed in light of tax statutes and regulations, Internal Revenue Service
("the Service") interpretations, and sparse but relevant case law. The article
includes detailed references in an effort to provide as complete a resource
as possible with regard to the tax consequences of past, present and future
operating strategies adopted by academic health centers in the managed care
environment.
I.

ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS AND MANAGED CARE

To appreciate the emerging role of tax law in the operation of academic
health centers, one must first understand traditional health center operating
methods.' Second, one must identify the principles of managed care which
conflict with those operating methods.' It is the conflicts between the

5. For purposes of this article, the term "academic health center" or "health center" means
an institution which combines teaching of health care professionals with the conduct of
biomedical research and clinical care. See Robert E. Mechanic & Allen Dobson, The Impact of
ManagedCare on ClinicalResearch: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 15 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996 at

72, 73. Most academic health centers are colleges or departments of degree granting institutions. See David Blumenthal and Gregg S. Meyer, The Future of The Academic Medical Center
UnderHealth Care Reform, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1812 (1993) [hereinafter Blumethal & Meyer,
Future]. The teaching and clinical care aspects of academic health centers are sometimes
undertaken at a private or public hospital not owned or controlled by the degree granting
institution. Mark C. Rogers et al., Cultural and OrganizationalImplications of Academic
Managed-CareNetworls, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1374, 1375 (1994). There are approximately 300
major teaching hospitals in the United States. Arnold M. Epstein, U.S. Teaching Hospitals in
the Evolving HealthCare System, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1203 (1995). While this article attempts
to identify common characteristics, it should be noted that academic health centers are more
dissimilar than similar. David Blumenthal & Gregg S. Meyer, Academic Health Centers in a
Changing Environment, 15 HEALTH AFF., Sum. 1996 at 211 [hereinafter Blumenthal & Meyer,
ChangingEnvironment] ("[Academic health center] leaders are fond of commenting that 'when
you've seen one academic health center, you've seen one academic health center."').
6. While the types of managed care organizations vary, the principles of managed care are
generic and are identified below. See infr notes 27-49, and accompanying text. For now it is
sufficient to define the acronyms by which managed care organizations are commonly
identified. "HMO" means "health maintenance organization." Traditionally, HMOs combined
health care payers (insurers) and health care providers (physicians and nurses) under one
authority. Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF.,
May-June 1997 at 134, 136. In traditional "staff-model" HMOs, physicians work solely for the
insurer. Id. A "group-model" HMO involves an insurer which contracts with one or more
group practices (e.g., a partnership or professional association) rather than individual
physicians. Id. A variation of the traditional staff or group HMO, is known as the "IPA" or
"PPO" HMO. Id. (discussing IPA's); Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed
Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF., Jan-Feb. 1997 at 125 (discussing PPOs).
"IPA" means "individual physician association." Gabel supra at 134. An IPA-model HMO
involves an insurer contracting with an association of several different practitioners who
provide health care for the insurer's enrollees but who are not the insurer's employees or
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operating nature of health centers and the principles of managed care which
threaten to deprive health centers of clinical revenues necessary to
accomplish their academic missions.7 Health center administrators are fully
cognizant of these conflicts and are employing a variety of strategies
designed to prevent the very definite threat from becoming reality. Indeed,
the idea that inaction will most likely lead to closure of health centers is not
a radical or alarmist viewpoint.' The strategies employed or contemplated
to date, however, implicate tax laws in ways which likewise cannot be
ignored any more than the threat from managed care principles. Just as
inaction can be fatal, ill-conceived action can be near fatal, at least from a
tax standpoint.9 Thus, it is similarly necessary to isolate the methods
utilized by health centers to reconcile their operational conflicts with
managed care principles and then compare those methods with applicable
tax requirements.

members of a single group practice. Id. at 136-37. A "PPO" means "preferred provider
organization" and is essentially another name for "IPA." Id.; Jensen et al., supra at 127. The
significant difference between traditional HMO's and IPA's/PPO's is that in the latter
organizations, enrollees have a greater choice of physicians since they are not limited to the
insurer's employees or a relatively few group practices. The newest managed care organization
is the "POS," or "point of service" organization. The POS-model HMOs are a form of IPA/PPO
HMOs which, in addition to wide choices under the insurance plan, allow an enrollee to obtain
health care from a physician other than those who have a formal agreement with the insurer
(out-of-network physicians), provided the enrollee agrees to an increased co-payment. Howard
L.Bailit, Market Strategiesand the Growth of Managed Carein AcADEMIc HEALTH CENTERS INTHE
MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT 3 (David Kom et al., eds., 1994). Other acronyms do not actually
refer to combined insurance/provider organizations or networks, but to provider/provider
organizations or networks. For example, "PHO" means "physician- or provider- hospital
organization." Id. at 5 (referring to "provider-hospital organization); Rogers et al., supra note
5, at 1377 (referring to "physician-hospital organization"). Since 1993, enrollment in
conventional insurance plans has decreased 12%, while enrollment has increased by 6% in
HMO's, 5%in PPO's and 11% in POS's. Jensen et al., supra at 126.
7. Health center reliance on clinical revenues to finance biomedical research can be
described as desperate according to the figures in one study. Between 1980 and 1994, the
percentage of medical school funding attributable to clinical revenues rose from 22% to 47%.
Mechanic &Dobson, supra note 5, at 78. Another study indicates, however, that between 1994
and 1998, hospital revenues will decrease by 30% and revenues generated by specialists, such
as those comprising health center staff, will also decrease by 30%. John K. Iglehart, Rapid
ChangesForAcademic Medical Centers (Part2), 332 NEW ENG. J.MED. 407 (1995) [hereinafter
Iglehart, Part 2).
8. One health center administrator bluntly states that "some organizations will fail."
Epstein, supra note 5 at 1207. "In some markets, the possible downsizing, closure, or
reorientation of local academic centers may be welcomed as part of the contraction of local
health care systems and costs." Blumenthal &Meyer, supra note 5, at 200-01.
9. "Clearly, it is much easier to make deals than to make deals work." Bailit, supra note
6, at 5.
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Methods
A. Academic Health Centers-Traditional/Operational
The most common characteristic of health centers is the traditional health
center mission statement. Health centers are similar to other nonprofit
health care providers in that they dispense charity (i.e. free, or reduced cost)
health care as part of normal operations. At least one estimate holds that
health centers provide the great bulk of free health care available in the
United States.10 But providing free or uncompensated health care is not the
primary mission of health centers. In addition, academic health centers
pursue their primary, more expensive and certainly less income producing
missions of training health care providers and conducting important
biomedical research.11 It is this primary mission which is most characteristic of academic health centers.
A second identifying characteristic of health center operations is the
heavy emphasis on specialized or "tertiary" care. Academic health centers
typically lack large or even moderate numbers of primary care physicians
and consequently suffer from an inability to provide primary care to the
extent available elsewhere within the relevant market. 2 Instead, academic
health care centers are "top-heavy" in specialized areas of treatment and
therefore historically provide little or no primary care. This top heavy
nature of health centers results in an almost total lack of what is referred to
as "vertical integration"-the overall staffing and related administrative
support necessary for a health center to offer a full range of health care

10. Teaching hospitals provide approximately 44% of charity health care in the United
States. Iglehart, supra note 7.
11. See generaly Blumenthal & Meyer, ChangingEnvironment, supra note 5, at 200.
12. "The clinical goals of the traditional academic center... focus on specialty and tertiary
care." Rogers et al., supr note 5, at 1375. As of 1994, the University of Florida Health Science
Center had a "faculty of 363 specialists, 239 of whom [had] lifetime contracts." Warren E. Ross,
Health Care Reform and OrganizationalChange in Academic Health Centers, in ACADEMIc
eds., 1994).
HEALTH CENTERS IN THE MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT 15, 19 (David Korn et al.,
Although the lack of primary care physicians is extreme in health centers, it is not exclusive to
health centers:
Since the mid 1980s, there has been increasing concern that we have begun to

produce too many physicians and that the distribution is skewed too far towards
specialty care. In 1960, 53% of our physician workforce was in primary care (defined
as those practicing as general practitioners or in the specialties of family practice,
general internal medicine, and general pediatrics); that proportion has steadily
decreased and is now approximately 30% [citation omitted]. In the 1994 Association
of Medical Colleges (AAMC) annual survey of the practice preferences of graduating
medical students, only 23% indicated a preference for primary care practice.

Epstein, supra note 5. For an interesting discussion of Congressional efforts to condition federal
funding on the number of primary care physicians trained by health centers see John K.
Iglehart, Rapid ChangesforAcademic Medical Centers (Part1), 331 NEw ENG. J. MED.1391, 1393
(1994) [hereinafter Igelhart, PartI].
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without routine or excessive reliance on referrals or inpatient care."3
Consequently, health centers limit treatment to patients with more
complicated and expensive medical needs, involving a higher number of
consultations and longer hospitalizations."
A third identifying characteristic involves the lack of internal treatment
coordination within health centers. As part of their efforts to maintain
expertise and implement new treatment methods, health center faculty
physician necessarily maintain a certain degree of actual patient contact.
Patient contact normally occurs through treatment vehicles known as
faculty practice plans. Essentially, each department within a college of
medicine, for example, might establish a separate corporation comprised of
the faculty physicians within the individual departments. Sometimes
referred to as "fiefdoms,1 5 faculty practice plans operate with a high degree
of independence from the health center's central administration. Thus, each
department has its own policies with regard to fees and treatment
procedures and those policies are not necessarily coordinated throughout
the academic medical center. In this respect, health centers often resemble
a collection of separate group practices which happen to occupy a single
facility.
Another characteristic common to health centers is the didactic method
of daily operations. The imperative to teach or conduct research not only
requires a sufficient supply of patients with certain symptoms, but longer
and more controlled access to patients than would otherwise apply in the
absence of a teaching or research mission."6 As a result, health center

13. "Vertical" and "horizontal" integration are terms emerging from the managed care
environment and refer to the ability to provide a full range of medical care, either within a
single organization in the case of vertical integration or through a network of affiliated
organizations in the case of horizontal integration. See Bailit, supra note 6, at 5.
14. Health centers attract a "sicker mix of patients because of their emphasis on tertiary
care." Peter D. Fox &Jeff Wasserman, Academic Medical Centers and Managed Care: Uneasy
Partners,12 HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993 at 85, 87.
15. Faculty practice plans are organized by department and then further divided by
subspecialty. The departments (and often the divisions or sections within them)
operate independently of one another and are commonly labeled by the faculty...
and administrators as "fiefdoms."
Id. at 89. See also Iglehart, Part 2, supra note 7, at 408.
16. Medical education and research are unique in that the persons involved in such
pursuits must ultimately have human specimens with which to work. Much of the
research and training given by plaintiff is aimed at learning and teaching diagnostic
techniques, and in order to do this, human tissue and specimens must be available
with which to perform research and to carry on the teaching ....There is no way to
properly train medical technicians other having them observe the work with
problems they are to see in actual practice.
Anateus Lineal 1948, Inc. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 118, 127 (W.D. Ark. 1973). In this
respect, patient access trends are particularly foreboding for health centers which are
"predicated on inpatient-oriented subspecialty practices delivered at high cost." Ross, supra
note 12, at 16. Between 1988 and 1993, inpatient days decreased by 16% and 18% for the
nonelderly and elderly populations, respectively. Gabel, supra note 6, at 142. By one estimate,
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physicians and residents often engage in a treatment protocol or order

longer hospitalization stays for teaching or research purposes."
The characteristics inherent in the academic health center mission,
organizational structure and operating procedures lead also to certain
characteristics of fee structure within health centers. Most importantly,
treatment costs are generally higher at academic health centers than they are
at nonacademic hospitals.18 Higher treatment costs result in part because
of the didactic motivations for certain tests or treatments, but also from the
specialized nature of care rendered by health center specialists, the desire
to remain on the cutting edge with regard to new and expensive medical
technology advances, and the overall need to conduct research. 9
What is sometimes referred to as the "Dean's tax'"2" exemplifies the

reasons for higher treatment costs within health centers. As noted above,
health care in academic health centers is most often delivered via faculty
practice plans. The revenues generated through faculty practice plans,21
though, are not intended merely to cover the cost of the particular treatment
hospital inpatient days will decrease by 24% between 1994 and 1998, while physician visits
will increase by only 3% during the same period. See Iglehart, Part2,supra note 7, at 408. At
Duke University, hospital inpatient days decreased by 15% to 20% between 1992 and 1994.
Rogers et al., supra note 5, at 1376. Johns Hopkins University Hospital noted a 14.4% decrease
in inpatient days between 1984 and 1994. Mechanic & Dobson, supra note 5, at 81. The
University of Pennsylvania experienced a 4.2% increase and the University Hospital in
Portland, Oregon experienced a 5.8% increase. Id. Over the same period, the University of
Washington (St. Louis) Medical Center experienced a 12.8% decrease, the University of
Minnesota Hospital experienced a 33.1% decrease, the Medical Center at the University of
California, San Francisco experienced a 30% decrease and the Stanford University Hospital
experienced a 22% decrease. Id. Nationwide, hospital occupancy rates are approximately 60%.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1205.
17. See Fox & Wasserman, supra note 14, at 85-86. ("Residents are commonly believed to
order tests or keep patients in treatment longer for didactic purposes. The extent to which the
additional services are integral to the training process or simply reflect long-ingrained habits
is difficult to measure.").
18. A study of seven health centers-the University of California-San Diego, the University
of California-San Francisco, the Washington (St. Louis) University, the University of Chicago,
West Virginia University, Columbia University, and Brigham and Women's Hospital (affiliated
with Harvard University)-found that inpatient treatment costs were 15% to 35% higher than
similar costs at community hospitals. Blumenthal & Meyer, ChangingEnvironment,supa note
5, at 200-01. Another study determined that teaching hospital costs, on average, are 20% higher
than costs at nonteaching hospitals, "with costs at major teaching hospitals approximately 45%
higher than nonteaching hospitals." Epstein, supra note 5, at 1203.
19. The high cost of [academic medical centers] reflects their mission and culture.
Because of their research and teaching roles, [academic medical centers] often
epitomize the "technological imperative:" the desire to use all available technology.
Much new technology is developed and tested in [academic medical centers]. What
might to some be expensive, marginally useful, or partially developed technologies,
may to the [academic medical center] faculty member be scientific progress.
Blumenthal & Meyer, Changing Environment,supra note 5, at 85.
20. Iglehart, Part2, supra note 7, at 408.
21. In 1992, total revenues earned by faculty practice plans were approximately $8.3
billion. Iglehart, Part1, supra note 12, at 1394.

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 24, No. 2

rendered. Instead, the revenues are typically devoted to several endeavors
which collectively increase costs to the patient or insurance carrier.
Revenues are used first to cover the direct costs of care. 2 In addition
revenues are devoted to departmental operating costs, which themselves
might be redundant with respect to a neighboring department.23 A separate
portion-the "Dean's tax"-is paid to the health center's central
administration for college-wide use.24 In some academic medical centers,
a portion of a particular faculty practice plan's revenue might also be used
to "cross-subsidize" a department or undertaking which does not generate
sufficient revenue to be self-sufficient, but which is nevertheless considered
important to the college as a whole.25 Finally, a portion of the departmental
revenues are used to supplement the compensation paid to faculty
physicians within the department.2" All of the endeavors which the
academic health care fee must support naturally result in higher costs to the
patient and his or her insurance provider than would otherwise apply in a
non-academic setting.
B.

Managed Care Principles

From an economic, bottom-line viewpoint, the typical characteristics of
academic health centers could fairly be labeled "inefficient" and thus make
academic health centers quite unattractive to managed care organizations.
The primary mission of training health care providers and conducting
research increases operating costs without immediate financial benefit and
thus is not readily supported by managed care organizations. In addition,
managed care relies heavily on primary care physicians, while health center
faculty/physicians are almost entirely comprised of specialists. Finally,
health centers traditionally nurture autonomous, professional faculty/
physician judgment and inquisitiveness without regard to the bottom line
cost concerns which are the hallmark of managed care.27 Indeed, traditional
22. Fox &Wasserman, supra note 14, at 89.
23. Id. For an interesting discussion of the uses of revenues generated by the University
of Maryland Faculty Practice Plan prior to 1981 see University of Maryland Physicians v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 732, 734-35 (1981).
24. The "deans tax" is normally between 5% and 20% of total practice plan revenues. Id.
See also Iglehart, Part2, supra note 7, at 408.
25. In the 1992-93 academic year "more than $800 million in faculty practice plan revenues
were used to support research." Mechanic & Dobson, supra note 5, at 78. By 1994, faculty
practice plan revenues accounted for 33.3% of medical school funding nationwide. Id. Some
health centers require that each department be self-sufficient. Fox &Wasserman, supra note
14, at 85, 89.
26. Fox &Wasserman, supra note 14, at 85, 89.
27. The great latitudes granted faculty and programs in most medical centers is an
essential component of the contract between faculty and institution, one in which a
faculty member donates a significant portion of annual earnings to the institution for
the opportunity to pursue diverse interests related to discovery, education, and
pursuits of national stature within the specialty.
Ross, supra note 12, at 17.
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faculty practice plans represent the antithesis of managed care's push for
vertical or horizontal integration.2 s Since managed care principles
increasingly control the flow of health care revenues,2 health center
administrators cannot just ignore the business judgments which label their
operations inefficient. They must instead modify or change the characteristics which those in control of health care revenue streams consider
inefficient.
There are various definitions of "managed care," but the term essentially
refers to an amoral" economic approach to health care delivery whereby the
cost of a particular treatment, referral, test, or hospital stay is given nearly
equal importance to an individual physician's opinion regarding the
necessity or advisability of that particular treatment, referral, test, or
hospital stay."1 That is, because of cost control demands imposed by health
28. See supra note 15.
29. In 1988 managed care organizations enrolled 29% of workers employed by private
businesses. Lynn Etheredge et al., What is DrivingHealth System Change?. 15 HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1996 at 93, 94. By 1995, the percentage had increased to 70 by one estimate and 73.5,
by another. Id.; Jensen et al., supranote 6, at 125. Likewise, Medicaid and Medicare, the major
government insurance programs, are rapidly shifting to managed care. In 1983, managed care
organizations enrolled only 3% of persons receiving Medicaid. Diane Rowland & Kristina
Hanson, Medicaid: Moving to Managed Care, 15 HEALTH AFF.Fall 1996 at 150. Twelve years
later, approximately 33% of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in managed care organizations.
Id. Medicare recipients are also shifting to managed care, though not as rapidly. Although
Medicare recipient enrollment in managed care organizations has increased by 40% per year
since 1994, only 10% of Medicare recipients were enrolled in managed care organizations by
1996. JoAnn Lamphere et al., The Surge In Medicare Managed Care: An Update, 16 HEALTH
AFF., May-June 1997 at 127, 128. The percentage of Medicare recipients enrolled in managed
care is expected to reach 34% by 2007. Id. Medicare reimbursements constitute the "single
largest source of payment for medical education in the United States." Kellyann Horger,
Comment, Medicare Reimbursement to Provider University Hospitals for Graduate Medical
Education Expenses in Light of Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 23 J. C. & U. L. 133
(1996). "Medicare direct payments account for twenty-nine percent of the total direct spending
for graduate medical education." Id. at 134.
30. I use the term "amoral" guardedly since the term implies a lack of moral concern, which
to some is tantamount to "immoral." This article does not address the ethical implications of
managed care. I would note, however, that a health care system which views the elevation of
cost considerations to a near equal level with professional judgment as "immoral" is likely to
be one in which costs eventually preclude a significant portion of the population from receiving
health care. An editorial writer states,
Imledical decisions made without cost-benefit calculation could lead to needlessly
high expenditures, jacking up premiums and forcing financially strapped families to
drop their policies .... Americans do not like to hear that treatment of health
problems that are not life-threatening must take account of costs. But if costs are not
accounted for, premiums will soar and steer whatever resources are devoted to health
care into secondary corners.
When Health Care is Refused, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1997, at 18.
31. Most definitions of managed care are functional, in the sense that they define managed
care in terms of the intended result. One definition is "the willful and synergistic collusion of
the business community and payers to bring down the costs of care by a fundamental
restructuring of how it [health care] is delivered and financed." Ross, supra note 12, at 16.
Another definition is "any measure that, from the perspective of the purchaser of health care,
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care consumers-government, employers, insurers, and patients-a
physician must give as much thought to cost containment as he or she gives
to substantive treatment decisions.32 Thus, at least in theory, managed care
principles do not allow a physician to undertake treatment activity merely
out of an abundance of caution or to facilitate teaching or research. Instead,
managed care principles inject a rather strict cost-benefit analysis into the
health care delivery system to a greater extent than that which existed prior
to the advent of managed care.
A review of managed care implementation methods clarifies the problems
facing health centers. Philosophically, managed care disdains traditional
fee-for-service arrangements whereby an insurer pays the cost for each
discrete treatment effort rendered by a physician, solely according to her
own professional judgment and without cost constraint or responsibility.3"
Fee-for-service arrangements almost completely deprive insurers of the
ability to apply bottom-line business judgments to treatment decisions.34
And because the range of possible treatment efforts are limited only by that

favorably affects the price of services, the site at which services are received, or their rate of
use." Fox & Wasserman, supra note 14, at 85.
32. The most readily ideitifiable factor responsible for the emergence of managed care is
the double-digit inflationary rate of health care premiums during the late '80s. During 1988 and
1989, for example, health insurance premiums increased by approximately 20% each year.
Gabel, supra note 6. The consumers of health care are not just patients, but all those who
contribute to the ultimate health care purchase price-employees who contribute to monthly
health insurance premiums, employers who also contribute, government which pays for
Medicare and Medicaid, and insurers who pay the costs in excess of total premiums received
under a conventional fee-for-service arrangement. Lynn Etheredge et al., supra note 29.
Managed care is motivated by consumers' demands to pay less for health care. Id. Thus, after
managed care had taken hold, premiums increased by only 2.5% in 1995 and .5% in 1996.
Gabel, supra note 6. Another study found that from 1994 to 1995 HMO premiums increased

by only .9%, PPO premiums increased by 2.6%, POS premiums increased by 2.2% and
conventional health plan premiums increased by 3.4%. Jensen et al., supra note 6.
33. The characteristics of traditional fee-for-service arrangements most antithetical to
managed care are a physician's ability and authority to decide what care to render without
administrative oversight, and a physician's financial incentive to "overuse care" in the case of
uncertainty. See David M. Eddy, BalancingCost and Quality In Fee-For-ServiceVersus Managed
Care, 16 HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997 at 162, 163.
34. The Service defines "fee-for-service" as follows:
Fee-For-Service-Under this arrangement, the physician is compensated based upon
his or her charges or on a fee schedule establishing the fee per unit of professional
service rendered .... A fee-for-service arrangement generally gives the hospital [or

insurance carrier] little control over the physician's compensation.
Internal Revenue Service, Announcement 92-83, 1922-22 I.R.B. 59 (Hospital Audit Guidelines).
The Service uses the term "per unit fee," in reference to tax exempt bond financing restrictions:
Per-unit fee means a fee based on a unit of service provided specified in the contract
or otherwise specifically determined by an independent third party, such as the
administrator of the Medicare program, or the qualified user. For example, a stated
dollar amount for each specified medical procedure performed.
Rev. Rul. 97-13, 1997-5 I.R.B. 18. Note that neither definition imposes restric-tions or limits on
the number of "units of services" which may be rendered. Thus, the service provider largely
controls overall cost in a per-unit or fee-for-service arrangement.
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which is considered "experimental,""5 the insurer's financial well-being is
essentially placed in the hands of health care providers who have the most
to gain by moderate or near-excessive inefficiency in treatment. To regain
or maintain final control over financial well-being, managed care prefers
capitation arrangements whereby an insurer pays a single fee for each
covered individual, regardless of the number and types of treatment
rendered. 6 The risk of economic loss resulting from the economically
inefficient health care-health care costs in excess of total premium-is
thus shifted to the health care provider and acts as a disincentive to
referrals, specialty care, precautionary tests, and longer hospitalization. 7
These latter treatment procedures, though, constitute the staple of
traditional health centers. Indeed, health center operations are structured
in their traditional manner precisely because of the fee-for-service
reimbursement model, which supports costs in excess of the immediate and
absolutely necessary expense of patient treatment. Hence, managed care's
basic philosophy threatens health centers which adhere to the traditional
methods of operation.
The business tools which managed care uses to implement philosophical
and bottom-line control over health care are varied, but collectively referred
to here as "utilization management."" Utilization management refers to a
variety of audit procedures used to control the cost of health care. The one
factor common to utilization management, though, is its basic opposition to
the traditional methods of health care delivery, especially the methods
utilized by health centers.
The most common tool for implementation of managed care principles
is the primary health care provider, whether that provider be an individual

35. "New treatments are categorized as experimental if there is not sufficient scientific
evidence about their safety or efficacy in the treatment of a specific disease." Mechanic &
Dobson, supra note 5, at 74.
36. The Internal Revenue Service defines a capitation fee as:
a fixed periodic amount for each person for whom the service provider or the
qualified user assumes the responsibility to provide all needed services for a specific
period so long as the quantity and type of services actually provided to covered
persons varies substantially. For example, a capitation fee includes a fixed dollar
amount payable per month to a medical service provider for each member of a health
maintenance organization plan for whom the provider agrees to provide all needed
medical services for a specified period. A capitation fee may include a variable
component of up to 20 percent of the total capitation fee designed to protect the
service provider against risks such as catastrophic loss.
Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-5 I.R.B. at 18. In a capitation arrangement, the total fee paid to the health
care provider per individual essentially amounts to a preset budget, beyond which the provider
cannot exceed except at his, her or its own expense. Iglehart, Part 1, supra note 12, at 1394.
37. A 1994 study found that 35% of managed care organizations paid care providers via
a capitation arrangement in 1989. Gabel, supra note 6, at 140. By 1994, the total had increased
to 50%.
38. See Arnold Milstein et al., Managing UtilizationManagement: A Purchaser'sView, 16
HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997 at 87; Mark J.Schlesinger et al., Medical Professionalism Under
ManagedCare: The Pros and Cons of Utilization Review, 16 HEALTH AFF., Jan-Feb. 1997 at 106.
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physician or a vertically integrated health care organization. Also known
as the "gatekeeper,"39 the primary care provider is responsible for the
patient's basic overall health needs and determines when, whether, and to
what facility or physician a patient will be referred in the event the patient
needs specialized care, hospitalization, or certain diagnostic services not
available from the primary care provider.' If the primary care physician or
organization is paid a flat fee per patient and the flat fee covers all
treatment, there is a natural incentive away from referrals, precautionary
tests, or hospitalization.4

A second managed care tool is the use of lower premiums to achieve
control over greater patient volume and thereby gain bargaining leverage
against health care providers. A managed care organization which has a
significant number of enrollees is in a strong position from which to
demand a capitation as opposed to a fee-for-service arrangement on the one
hand, or failing a capitation arrangement, a discounted fee-for-service
arrangement on the other.4 2 Indeed, an organization which enrolls a large
number of insureds (potential patients) by offering lower premiums has
both the imperative and the market clout to negotiate a capitation or a
discounted fee-for service arrangement. The imperative exists because the
lower income (by way of decreased premiums) necessitates lower expenses
(by way of lower hospital fees);43 the clout exists because the lower

39. Mechanic & Dobson, supra note 5,at 82.
40. "Most HMOs require that patients receive a referral from a primary care gatekeeper
before they can receive non-emergency specialty or hospital care." Id.
41. Id. The extent to which gatekeepers are financially influenced to withhold treatment
can only be measured "via reasoning that unfolds in the distant reaches of physician's conscious
and unconscious thought processes." Milstein, supra note 38, at 87-88.
42. Two commentators suggest that 85% of health centers are located in areas with
populations of 360,000 or more, and that such a population level represents the point at which
managed care market penetration can be achieved. Blumenthal &Meyer, Future, supra note 5,
at 1814. The rapidity with which managed care is overtaking the market is nothing short of
astonishing. As of 1995, approximately 45% of the national workforce was enrolled in managed
care organizations (20% HMOs, 20-25% PPOs). Epstein, supra note 5,at 1204. Selected data
from various markets in which health centers operate illustrate the point. In Baltimore (Johns
Hopkins University), managed care controls nearly 70% of the market. Robert E. Mechanic and
Allen Dobson, The mpact of Managed Care on ClinicalResearch: A PreliminaryInvestigation,
15 HEATH AFF., Fall 1996 at 72, 76. In Minneapolis (University of Minnesota), managed care
controls 78.5%. Id. In Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania), managed care controls 49.4
percent. Id. In Portland (Oregon Health Sciences University), the percentage is at least 63%.
Id. In San Francisco (University of California, San Francisco), managed care controls 83.2%.
Id. In Seattle, (University of Washington) managed care controls 60.8% of the market. Id. As
of 1996, 36% of University of California-San Diego health center patients were enrolled in HMO
plans. Blumenthal & Meyer, ChangingEnvironment, supra note 5, at 203. Forty-nine percent
of University of California, San Francisco patients, 19% of University of Chicago patients, 12%
of West Virginia University patients, and 26% of Washington University (St. Louis) patients
were HMO enrollees. Id.
43. A survey of more than 2000 health insurers showed that single and family coverage
premiums for managed care insurers were lower than premiums for non-managed care insurers.
Jensen et al., supra note 6,at 130. The single coverage monthly premium averaged $175 for
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premiums allow the managed care organization to deliver a larger patient

revenue stream to the health care provider that can meet its capitation or
discounted fee-for-service demand.
Having obtained a favorable
arrangement, the managed care organization remains in a strong position
from which to influence the costs of treatment rendered by the contracted
health care provider. When there is no single, large managed care insurer
within a market, but several smaller ones which collectively enroll a large
part of the relevant market's patient base, the collective effect can be similar
to that which might occur in a market dominated by a single managed care
organization.

A fourth cost control tool common to managed care is the clinical
guideline.

Essentially, these are standardized treatment procedures

promulgated by national organizations which, if followed, determine the
treatment protocol for identified ailments." Increasingly, managed care
organizations are commissioning the articulation of clinical guidelines with
the result that more and more treatment methods are subject to apparently
objective administrative oversight and routinization."
Deviation from
clinical guidelines, as might be most expected in a learning environment,
is strongly discouraged because of the potential for increased costs."
The final common tool employed by managed care is "utilization" or
"concurrent" reviews. In essence, these are audit-type procedures by which
managed care insurers review and question the necessity of treatments and
hospitalizations ordered by a physician. 4" Such reviews may include
"precertification" of need prior to referral or hospitalization, as well as
postcertification of treatment already rendered. A poor outcome may not
necessarily result in payment denial" but will generally influence the
managed care organization's willingness to allow enrollees to utilize the
care-giver in subsequent insurance years.
The tools of managed care are not exclusively wielded by insurers, but by
health care providers as well. In a pure capitation arrangement, the insurer
has less motivation to utilize the tools because after paying the single rate,
the insurer is no longer at risk for the financial consequences of inefficient
health care delivery models. In such a situation, it is the health care
provider who or which is at risk and who or which has the greatest

conventional plans, $157 for HMOs, $174 for PPO's and $172 for POS'. Id. The family coverage
monthly premium was $440 for conventional plans, $411 for HMOs, $422 for PPOs, and $434

for POS'. Id.
44. Gabel, supra note 6, at 142-43.
45. There were approximately 700 clinical guidelines in 1989 and over 1800 by 1997. Id.
Seventy-five percent of managed care organizations use clinical guidelines. Id.
46. Eighty-two percent of managed care organizations "encourage" providers to follow
clinical guidelines. Id.
47. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 38.
48. A survey of 109 auditing firms used by insurers to conduct hospital utilization reviews
found that 18 firms had payment denial rates of 1%or less, but 33 had denial rates of 10% or
higher. Id. at 113.
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motivation to implement managed care tools. Hence, a primary care
provider with a high degree of vertical integration and internal cost control
is in a stronger position from which to agree to a capitation or discounted
fee-for-service arrangement in exchange for the increased patient revenue
delivered by a managed care organization. 41 In a discounted fee-for-service
arrangement, however, the insurer and the health care provider share the
risk of inefficient health care delivery. The fees paid by the insurer are less
than market rates in a traditional fee-for-service arrangement, so the health
care provider is motivated to implement more efficient forms of health care
delivery. Still, the insurer is obligated to pay for each discrete treatment
covered by a discounted fee-for-service arrangement and thus has similar
motivations to enforce efficient health care delivery.
C.

Conflicts Between Academic Health Centers and Managed Care

Quite obviously, traditionally-operated academic health centers suffer
severe disadvantages in a managed care environment regardless of who
wields the managed care tools. As noted earlier, health centers generally
specialize in tertiary care and thus lose access to patients and clinical
revenues, first because they lack primary care faculty physicians to act as
gatekeepers and second because those who do act as gatekeepers are
discouraged from using the higher-costing, specialized services characteristic of academic health centers. Likewise, capitation arrangements seek the
lowest cost for health care and thus do not support higher fees generally
charged by health centers and used to cross-subsidize other endeavors such
as teaching and research. The departmental fractionalization typically
found in academic health centers as a result of separately-operated faculty
practice plans encourages higher administrative costs which managed care
insurers do not readily accept. Fractionalization also inhibits managed
care's ability to impose economic controls from a central location with easily
defined responsibility and oversight.50 Treatments, tests, hospitalizations,

49. The lack of vertical integration in traditional health centers puts health centers at a
particular disadvantage in a managed care environment:
The absence of a unified governance and management structure or singular income
and expense plan for the institution has created mounting difficulties for medical
schools .... The ascension of managed care has exacerbated the vulnerabilities of
decentralized faculty practice plans. Integration across the practice is required for
optimal cost effectiveness as well as empowerment of a single negotiating unit.
Consolidation spreads the risks of a volatile market that can rapidly channel whole
populations of patients. More importantly, integration of the practice is required if
the group is to successfully accept risk in the capitated environment. This is because
all members of the group must be subject to common utilization management
oversight, the group must be able to deal with physicians who cannot practice cost
effectively, and over time the group must be able to size and configure itself to meet
the market demands.
Ross, supra note 12, at 20-21.
50. Id.
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and referrals undertaken by academic health centers for teaching and
research purposes, reflected in and subsidized by higher patient fees
charged by health centers, are also not readily agreed to by managed care
organizations. Finally, and not the least in importance, faculty physicians
stereotypically maintain a level of contempt for any process which questions
their academic judgment"1 or applies year-end, bottom line principles to
their treatment/research endeavors."2 All of these disadvantages result in
less funding to support the primary teaching and research functions of
academic health centers.
Health center administrators are turning to a number of strategies
designed to reduce the disadvantages imposed by managed care principles.
In general, these strategies are intended to achieve vertical and/or horizontal
integration. They include restructuring of faculty practice plans to achieve
centralized control, 3 aggressive acquisitions of primary care physicians and
primary care practices," joint ventures with for-profit health care
providers, 5 joint operating agreements with other tax exempt health care
51. "Contempt" seems to run both ways. One study reports "multiple references to
'academic arrogance' and to 'managed care organizations that only care about costs.'" Mechanic
& Dobson, supra note 5, at 87.
52. The aversion to bottom-line cost considerations is not only held by faculty physicians;
it is also shared by the general public:
Ever since the 1940's, when third-party payment cut the connection between
demanding treatments and having to pay for them, people have latched on to the idea
that costs should play no role in decisions about medical treatments. Today, there
is a strong taboo against explicitly taking costs into account when determining the
appropriate use of a treatment.
Eddy, supranote 33, at 162.
53. Some academic medical centers have already moved to create such entities, which are
referred to as clinical service organizations and physician-hospital organizations, among other
names. They are designed to integrate the activities of medical schools, faculty practice plans,
and hospitals and to reduce the conflicts. The new organizations usually serve as the focal
point for negotiating contracts with managed-care plans, and they become the recipients of all
professional and hospital revenue from patient care.
Iglehart, Part 2, supra note 7, at 409. The author lists the University of Florida, Johns
Hopkins University, the University of Illinois, the University of Massachusetts, the University
of Michigan, and the University of Minnesota as examples of institutions which have
restructured their faculty practice plans. Id. For a detailed discussion of the restructured
faculty practice plan at the University of Florida, see Ross, supra note 12, at 15.
54. For example, in the early 1990's Duke University set out to increase by 100% the
number of primary care physicians it employed. Rogers et al., supra note 5. at 1376. The
University of Pennsylvania is another prominent institution engaged in primary care physician
acquisitions. Mechanic & Dobson, supra note 5, at 83. See also Iglehart, Part2, supra note 7,
at 410 (discussing Penn's need for 318 additional primary care physicians).
55. Iglehart, Part2, supra note 7, at 410 (discussing separate joint venture, wholly-owned
HMO's, and other arrangements involving a variety of universities, including Georgetown
University, Duke, Johns Hopkins University, Northwestern University, University of
Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt University, Emory University, Tulane University, University of
Michigan, and the University of Chicago). For a discussion of preliminary efforts by the
University of Missouri to find a for-profit joint venturer see J. Duncan Moore, Jr., University of
Missouri to Partnerwith Tenet, 25 MODERN HEALTH CARE, Oct. 2, 1995 at 52.
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providers,"8 and the creation of tax exempt HMO's. 7 Through these
strategies, health center administrators hope to reduce overhead costs while
expanding the range of health care services available from their facilities
and thereby gain or assure access to the patient flow necessary to
accomplish their academic missions. Many of these strategies are borrowed
or copied from taxable and tax exempt non-academic health centers, and all
involve measures which could threaten the tax exempt status of academic
medical center revenues if not properly implemented; the methods
implicate every basic provision of tax exempt law (except the limitations on
political activity), including the prohibitions against private inurement,
private benefit, and the taxation of unrelated business income.5 "
56. The University of Cincinnati entered into a joint operating agreement which is the
subject of Pri. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996). The joint operating agreement is discussed
in detail in Section IV. See infro text accompanying notes 209-221.
57. "Among the institutions that have started H.M.O.'s are the Universities of Arkansas,
Iowa, Michigan, and Rochester; and George Washington, Vanderbilt, and Wake Forest
Universities." Katherine S. Mangan, To Protect TeachingHospitals, Some Universities Start Their
Own Health Maintenance Organizations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 3, 1997 at A33. The
quoted article provides a good overview the of the managed care pressures which have led the
University of Texas System to begin plans for its HMO.
58. Unfortunately, space limitations do not allow for a complete discussion of issues
relating to tax exempt financing. The following summary is designed to alert the reader of the
need to consider the impact of managed care strategies on tax exempt bonds which may have
been used to benefit a health center facility.
Tax exempt bond restrictions are relevant if the proceeds from such bonds have been used
to finance, reconstruct, or acquire property owned by a private or public health center involved
in managed care arrangements. The restrictions are designed to prevent the proceeds of tax
exempt bond financing from being used for a private benefit or in a manner which would
constitute unfair competition for purposes of the unrelated business income tax provisions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.141-2(a).
Internal Revenue Code § 103 provides that the interest earned on certain bonds is excluded
from gross income. The bonds to which the exclusion applies include state and local (i.e.,
"governmental"), and "qualified 501(c)(3)" bonds. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (relating to governmental
bonds); I.R.C. § 141(e)(1)(g); I.R.C. § 145 (relating to qualified 501(c)(3) bonds. For the interest
on such bonds to be tax exempt, property acquired from the proceeds of governmental or
qualified 501(c)(3) bonds must be owned by a state or local governmental entity, or a 501(c)(3)
organization. I.R.C. § 145(a)(1); I.R.C. § 150(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.141-3(b)(2). A person or
entity which does not possess legal title may nevertheless be treated as the "owner" if the
person or entity possesses sufficient indicia of ownership, such as the right to control the use
of, or access to a facility. Tress. Reg. § 1.141-3(b). Thus, for example, a group practice which
leases a certain department within a financed health center is generally viewed as the owner
of that department for purposes of the tax exempt bond financing rules even though the lease
interest is less than fee simple. Id.
A second requirement for tax exempt bonds is that no more than a de minim us amount of
the bond proceeds may be used for "private business use." In the case of governmental bonds,
no more than 10% of the proceeds from the bond issue may be used for private benefit. I.R.C.
§ 141(b)(1). In the case of qualified 501(c)(3) bonds, no more than 5% of the net proceeds may
be so used. I.R.C. § 145(a)(2(B). Private business use is defined as access to bond proceeds by
any person engaged in a trade or business other than a governmental or 501(c)(3) organization
i.e., a "nonqualified user." I.R.C. § 141(b)(6)(A); I.R.C. § 145(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.141-3.
If an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization gains access to the proceeds or a financed facility in a
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II.

TAX ENABLING AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

The imperative underlying the various strategies employed by health
center administrators is that revenues generated or saved through efforts to
compete in the managed care environment should not be reduced by the
burden of taxation. To avoid violating this imperative, health center

manner which constitutes an unrelated trade or business, the organization is a nonqualified
user with respect to the particular use. But access, per se, does not result in private business
use. Access to bond proceeds or a financed facility constitutes private business use if that
access results in a "special legal entitlement" or, in the absence of a special legal entitlement,
a "special economic benefit" for a nonqualified user. Treas. Reg. § 141-3(b)(1).
Managed care strategies must also account for restrictions relating to certain management
contracts. A management contract is any agreement in which a nonqualified user provides
services involving, or conducts a function of a tax exempt bond-financed facility. Rev. Proc.
97-13, 1997-5 I.R.B. 18. Under such an arrangement, there is the possibility that tax exempt
bond proceeds are used for a private trade or business. For example, an arrangement whereby
a nonexempt group practice operates a health center's outpatient clinic requires the provision
of services involving the health center and is therefore a management contract if the health
center was financed by tax exempt bond proceeds. Id. Treasury Regulation § 1.141-3(b)(4)
indicates that whether a management contract results in private business use depends upon an
analysis of the particular facts and circumstances. The regulation provides, however, that a
management contract will normally result in private business use, if the contract "provides for
compensation for services rendered with compensation based, in whole or in part, on a share
of net profits from the operation" of a bond-financed facility.
Revenue Procedure 97-13 identifies certain management contracts which do not result in
private business use. The procedure reiterates that arrangements which transfer a share of net
profits to a nonqualified user generally results in private business use. But the Revenue
Procedure also identifies compensations methods which are not treated as based upon net
profits. Variable compensation methods based upon gross or adjusted gross revenues are
sometimes permissible, as are incentive compensation methods based upon increases or
decreases in gross or adjusted gross revenues, or a decrease in expenses. The Revenue
Procedure also allows for a variable compensation method based upon a specified amount for
each discrete service rendered. Thus, for example, a compensation method determined by
multiplying a fixed rate by the number of patients treated (i.e., a fee-for-service arrangement)
would not be viewed as one based upon net revenues.
The one important caveat to the permissible variable compensation methods is that if they
are used too much, they become the functional equivalent of compensation based upon net
profits, and thus result in impermissible private business use. Revenue Procedure 97-13
determines the amount of allowable variability in compensation methods based upon the length
of the contract or the expected useful life of the financed facility. The shorter the length of time,
the more variability is allowed in the measure of compensation. In no event, however, does the
Revenue Procedure allow the use of gross or adjusted gross revenues, or expenses, as a
permanent method of compensation. Hence, any variability in the method by which a service
provider is compensated-even one which the Service does not view as a distribution of net
proceeds-will trigger close scrutiny of a management contract involving tax exempt bond
financed facilities.
When a managed care strategy cannot be implemented without violating the private benefit
use restrictions with respect to an existing bond issuance, Treasury Regulation § 1.141-12 and
Revenue Procedure 95-15, 1997-5 I.RIB. 21, provide procedures which must be followed to
prevent violation of the bond covenants, i.e., the taxation of interest earned on the bonds to the
bond holders.

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 24, No. 2

administrators and counsel must correctly apply various enabling and
enforcement provisions relating to tax exempt organizations. Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) § 501(c)(3) is of primary importance. That provision
identifies organizations entitled to tax exempt status. It also provides two
related and relevant prohibitions applicable to the identified organizations;
the first provision is a prohibition against "private inurement," and the
second is a prohibition against "private benefit." Two enforcement
mechanisms applicable to health centers in the managed care environment
include the newly enacted "intermediate sanctions" contained in I.R.C. §
4958 and the unrelated business income tax rules contained in I.R.C. § 511
through I.R.C. § 513. This section provides a general overview of the
provisions most applicable to health center strategies in the managed care
environment. The provisions are analyzed in greater detail with respect to
particular strategies discussed in Sections III.
A.

The Tax Exempt Purpose

Identifying the mission of academic health centers and categorizing that
mission within the terms of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) effects the analysis of each of
the other tax provisions relevant to the managed care strategies adopted by
health centers. Thus, it is extremely important that the mission of academic
health centers be placed within the proper context of the purposes
enumerated by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).5" While it is tempting and even
convenient to view health centers solely within the jurisprudential
precedents applicable to nonacademic tax exempt hospitals, doing so
improperly limits the activities in which health centers may properly
engage. Nonacademic tax exempt hospitals are tax favored for the laudable,
but singular purpose of health care delivery and their legitimate activities

59. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) provides exemption for:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Of the approximate 1.5 million exempt organizations in the United States, 630,000 are classified
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Internal Revenue Service, Fact Sheet 97-7 (Feb. 1997). Hospitals and
other healthcare providers comprise the largest single group of exempt organizations. James
J.McGovern, The IRS Compliance Program for Nonprofit Hospitals,16 ExuMIr ORG. TAX REV. 201
(1997).
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are defined in light of that singular purpose."0 So, for example, when
determining whether an activity is "substantially related" for purposes of the
unrelated business income tax, the activity is properly analyzed solely in
terms of its importance to health care delivery."1 Health centers, on the
other hand, are tax favored because they train health care providers,
conduct research and provide health care. 2 Thus, the determination of
whether an activity is "substantially related" must be analyzed in terms of
the activity's importance to teaching, research (neither of which necessarily
have immediate relevancy to health care delivery), as well as health care
delivery. Analyzing health centers in the exact terms applicable to
nonacademic tax exempt health centers would therefore distort the proper
activities of health centers. 3 As will be shown with greater particularity in
60. The requirements for obtaining I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status for nonacademic health centers
are stated in Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. The primary analysis centers around the
degree to which an organization provides health care to a sufficiently large segment of the
community. Id. The conduct of research and training was mentioned secondarily in the ruling,
as evidence that surplus funds did not result in private benefit. Id. Under Revenue Ruling
69-545, the factors which resulted in tax exemption included: (1) operation of a full-time
emergency room, (2) emergency room treatment made available to all persons in need without
regard to ability to pay, (3) an independent board of trustees, (4) an open medical staff with
privileges available to all qualified physicians consistent with the size and nature of the hospital
facilities. Id. In Revenue Ruling 83-157, the Service ruled that under certain circumstances,
the absence of an emergency room would not preclude qualification under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
Rev. Rul. 83- 157, 1983-2-C.B. 94. In any event, the precedents most relevant to health care
organizations are almost exclusively concerned with direct health care delivery as the measure
of tax exempt status. See also Internal Revenue Service, Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B.
59 (Hospital Audit Guidelines).
61. See infro notes 119 through 121 and accompanying text for the discussion of
"substantially related" and the unrelated business income tax.
62. That health centers are properly classified as charitable, educational, and scientific
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is not so much a disputed point as it is an overlooked point. In the few
cases involving the qualification of academic health centers under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3), the parties
essentially stipulated the point. See University of Mass. Med. Sch. Group Practice v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681
(1979); University of Maryland, P.A. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981). A former IRS official recently
admitted that the Service has been slow to recognize and respond to the characteristics
pertaining to academic health centers:
Faculty practice plans enjoy an especially tax-favored status under the Internal
Revenue Code, despite taking a variety of organizational forms and the fact that
physician members often dominate their governing boards. While the IRS must be
considered a recent convert-recognizing exemption only after a string of
embarrassing losses in court-it now appears to resolve community benefit and
private benefit issues liberally in the faculty practice plan setting. This is based, in
large part, on the distinctive aspects of these organizations stemming from their
educational activities as well as their relationship to and governance by affiliated
universities and medical schools.
T.J. Sullivan, Tax-Exempt Clinics-ExemptionsAgain Available to Groups with a Charitable,
Educational,or Research Focus, 15 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 371, 373 (1996).
63. Two other commentators briefly discuss the need to consider health centers under
different constraints than would apply to nonacademic health care providers:
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the sections which follow, identifying the mission of academic health
centers in terms of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) frees health centers of the limitations
which are properly applicable to single purpose, nonacademic tax exempt
hospitals, but which are inappr6priate and counterproductive to
multi-purpose academic health centers.
Three of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)'s eight tax exempt categories apply to academic
health centers." The applicable categories are "charitable," "educational,"
and "scientific." 5 The term "charitable" is so broadly interpreted that it
may include almost any legal endeavor engaged in for the improvement of
humankind without regard to financial profit.6" In particular, though, the
term has been interpreted to include the provision of health care to a
sufficiently large number of beneficiaries such that the entire community
benefits. 7 For the most part, the term "educational" is also easily
identified." The tax regulations, provide that "education" relates to "the
instruction or training of the individual" and the "instruction of the

As stated by key IRS officials, the IRS is concerned about whether an IDS [Integrated
Delivery System] is indistinguishable from a private medical practice, especially
when the IDS entity's formation was based largely on the acquisition of one or more
such practices. Two key characteristics of a private medical practice are total
physician control and payout of all or substantially all of the income to the physicians
as compensation. In traditional faculty practice plans, even where there is total
physician control as members or directors, a university or teaching hospital typically
retains substantial control over the plan through extensive reserved powers.
Physician compensation is often controlled by the policies of the university or
teaching hospital, and the physicians earn significantly less compensation than in a
private medical practice. Also, by paying the physicians at lower compensation
levels, the faculty practice plan is able to reserve income to fund hospital medical
departments and substantial and meaningful teaching and research. These
distinguishing characteristics undoubtedly provide the basis for the IRS' greater
comfort level with faculty practice plans.
Michael W. Peregrine and Bernadette M. Broccolo, New Limitations on Physician Participation
in CorporateGovernance, 65 TAX NOTES 121 (1994).

64. See supra note 62.
65. The other I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) classifications are religious, testing for public safety,
literary, fostering of national or international sports competition, and the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals.
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1. For an in-depth discussion of the term "charitable," see
Bruce R.Hopkins, THE LAW OF TAX ExEMpT ORGANIZATIONS 69-108 (6th ed. 1992).
67. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158
(1978).
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). It is harder to define the term in situations when
an organization challenges conventional or contemporary mores. See e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc.
v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980); National Alliance v. United States 710 F.2d 868
(D.C. Cir. 1983). In Big Mama Rag, the Service refused to classify an organization as
"educational" because the organization's publications regarding the acceptability of homosexual
lifestyles did not evince a "full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an
individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion," as required by
Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). 631 F.2d at 1032-33. The Court overruled the service
and declared the regulation unconstitutionally vague. 631 F. 2d at 1039-40.

19971

TAX EXEMPTION ISSUES

public.""9 Organizations which are presumptively engaged in educational
activities include colleges or professional schools with a regular curriculum,
faculty, student body, and place of instruction.' A "scientific" organization
includes one which conducts research as part of the education of college or
university students, as a step towards publication of information in a form
available to interested persons, or in search of a cure for disease.71 The
traditional academic health center fits neatly into all three of the categories
discussed above, unlike the nonacademic tax exempt health care provider
which normally achieves exempt status solely under the charitable
classification.
Whether an organization is actually operated for a purpose specified in
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) depends upon an analysis of the various activities in
which the organization engages. The totality of activities must demonstrate
that the organization is "primarily" engaged in activities designed to
accomplish an exempt purpose.72 If an organization engages in an
unnecessary activity and that unnecessary activity comprises a substantial
part of the organization's total endeavors, the organization will not be
entitled to tax exemption.7 3 Thus, exemption is determined as a practical
matter by identifying an organization's stated purposes within the structure
of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), isolating the various activities in which the
organization engages, and then determining the extent to which the various
activities further a nonexempt purpose.
The importance of recognizing the tri-part basis of tax exemption for
health centers under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is therefore apparent. Although
academic health centers are borrowing managed care strategies employed
by their nonacademic counterparts, the tax standards by which the
propriety of those strategies are tested differ in the academic arena precisely
because health centers claim exemption under the scientific and
educational classification, in addition to the charitable classification.74

69. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(a)-(b).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii)(example 1).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5).

72. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c); B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57
(1978).
73. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 66 S. Ct. 112 (1945). ("The
presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the
exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly educational purposes."). Id. at 283,
112 S. Ct. at 114.
74. In 1993, for example, the Service began to insist that no more than 20% of the
governance board of certain exempt health care providers be comprised of physicians who also
provide medical services on behalf of the organization. Peregrine &Broccolo, supra note 63;
Gerald M. Griffith, Physician "Control"and Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status: When a
Minority Interest Equals a Majority Interest, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 121 (1994). The idea is
that control over the organization by persons with a financial interest in the corporation's
performance creates an impermissible potential for private inurement. Peregrine & Broccolo,
supra note 63, at 122. But the 20% test is not applicable in the academic health center setting:
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Thus, an analysis which concludes that a nonacademic health center is
unable to obtain tax exempt status for a wholly-owned HMO insurer,
because the capture of a certain portion of the health care market (via the
HMO) is deemed unnecessary to the charitable purpose,75 would not
necessarily apply in the case of an academic health care center's
establishment of an HMO, because the capture of a portion of the health
care markets (i.e., patients) can be objectively demonstrated as absolutely
necessary to health centers' educational or scientific purpose. Health care
teaching and research require human subjects with real ailments." The
addition of the educational and scientific purpose of the academic health
center requires that the tax analysis be broader than that which applies
when the sole purpose is charitable health care delivery.

A faculty practice plan, however, may have more opportunity than a PHO, MSO
[Management Service Organization], or IDS [Integrated Delivery System] for
acceptable outside checks and balances through the role of the dean or university
administration generally. Faculty practice plans likely will be able to show far greater
research activities than the typical clinic and also may be able to demonstrate a
greater commitment to charity care. These indicia of community benefits, coupled
with reasonable checks and balances on the compensation process, could serve to
overcome the Service's concerns on physician control for faculty practice plans...
There are, of course, other requirements for exemption of faculty practice plans, such
as appropriate controls to assure reasonableness of physician compensation.
Griffith, supra at 125.
75. In the Geisinger Health Plan line of cases, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
an IPA-model HMO did not qualify for tax exempt status because (1) it did not directly provide
health services, and (2)its only purpose was to provide patients to its parent organization and
that purpose was insufficient to obtain tax exempt status. Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) ("GHP I") affd, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994) ("GHP
II"). See also Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394 (1993). GHPI is discussed
in detail in Section III. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
76. "Because those in charge of the medical school consider the opportunity for
students to observe and assist in the actual treatment of patients a vital and necessary
part of their medical education, the faculty members' patient care activities at the
hospital cannot be separated from their teaching function. While teaching patients
in the university hospital, members of the [faculty practice plan] are generally
accompanied by medical students, interns or residents, and are simultaneously
instructing students and demonstrating techniques of patient care."
University of Mass. Med. Sch. Group Practice v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1299, 1301 (1980).
Clinical instruction refers to teaching medical knowledge, skills, and procedures in
the course of rendering medical care to patients. It includes the performance of
medical services by faculty members in the presence of students and patient care by
students under supervision. Clinical instruction is an indispensable primary
component of training undergraduate and graduate students at the Medical School.
With very few exceptions, all patients at the Hospital consent to being used as
teaching examples.
University of Md. Physicians, P.A. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981).
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Internal Revenue Code § 50277 exemplifies an important point regarding
the method by which an organization may gain tax exemption under the
eight classifications contained in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Internal Revenue Code
§ 502 essentially prevents an organization from obtaining tax exempt status
merely because it financially supports other organizations which provide
Thus, an
one or more of the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) services directly."8
organization which engages in a normal business activity but "feeds" all of
its profits to other organizations which directly engage in one of the eight
purposes listed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is not engaging in an exempt activity. 7
Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b) extends I.R.C. § 502 to preclude an
organization from gaining tax exempt status solely by providing goods or
services, as opposed to profits, exclusively to unrelated tax exempt
organizations."' Thus, a publisher cannot obtain tax exempt status solely
because it sells textbooks exclusively to academic health centers, even

77. Internal Revenue Code § 502(a) provides:
An organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business
for profit shall not be exempt from taxation under section 501 on the grounds that all
of its profits are payable to one or more organizations exempt from taxation under
section 501.
78. The organization described in CF. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.
1951), is the classic example of a "feeder organization."
79. For example, an organization which operates a beach resort and uses all profits for the
relief of the poor and the care of children would be entitled to tax exempt status if not for I.R.C.
§ 502. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir. 1938).
80. Treasury Regulation § 1.502-1(b) provides:
(b) If a subsidiary organization of a tax exempt organization would itself be exempt
on the ground that its activities are an integral part of the exempt activities of the
parent organization, its exemption will not be lost because as a matter of accounting
between two organizations, the subsidiary derives a profit from its dealings with its
parent organization, for example, a subsidiary organization which is operated for the
sole purpose of furnishing electric power used by its parent organization, a tax
exempt educational organization, in carrying on its educational activities. However,
the subsidiary organization is not exempt from tax if it is operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business which would be an unrelated trade or
business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if regularly carried on by the parent
organization. For example, if a subsidiary organization is operated primarily for the
purpose of furnishing electric power to consumers other than its parent organization
(and the parent's tax exempt subsidiary organization), it is not exempt since such
business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by the parent
organization. Similarly, if the organization is owned by several unrelated exempt
organizations, and is operated for the purpose of furnishing electric power to each of
them, it is not exempt since such business would be an unrelated trade or business
if regularly carried on by any one of the tax exempt organizations. For purposes of
this paragraph, organizations are related only if they consist of(1) A parent organization and one or more of its subsidiary organizations; or
(2) Subsidiary organizations having a common parent organization. An exempt
organization is not related to another exempt organization merely because they both
engage in the same type of exempt activities.
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though doing so contributes to the health centers' teaching purposes."1 This
conclusion does not apply, though, when an organization provides
otherwise commercial goods and services solely to its parent organization,
or to organizations controlled by the parent organization (sister
corporations), provided the commercial goods and services further the
parent's exempt purpose."2 If the publisher discussed above is owned by the
health center and provides textbooks solely to its parent or sister
organization, it may achieve tax exempt status.83 In that instance, the
activity is not viewed as a commercial, nonexempt enterprise because the
purchasing and selling of textbooks is necessary to the parent's exempt
purpose and is deemed to occur within a single entity, notwithstanding the
formal corporate separateness between the parties."4
It is important to understand the limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 502 and
Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b). A primary necessity of managed care is the
consolidation of services within a single health care system or network. By
denying tax exempt status to an organization which supports unrelated, tax
exempt organizations, but which does not directly engage in a charitable
activity, I.R.C. § 502 prohibits some consolidation methods which might
otherwise be adopted by health center administrators.
Health center
administrators, for example, are not completely free to enter into alliances
with unrelated but similarly-oriented organizations which would likewise
benefit from the consolidation of administrative tasks. The statute and
regulation would deny tax exempt status to the resulting "consolidation"
entity and thereby reduce the savings generated via the consolidation
strategy. The recognition of this point allows health center administrators
to plan alternative means of consolidation.
B. Private Inurement and PrivateBenefit
The extent to which a tax exempt organization benefits individuals or,
put another way, fails to benefit the community at large is another concern
relevant to health center administrators' efforts to survive in a managed care
environment. Regardless of the strategy used, the resulting transaction must
further the community benefit embodied in the charitable, educational, and
scientific purposes for which health centers are tax exempt. Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) addresses this community benefit requirement in
81. Although the Tax Court severely criticized the regulation, it ultimately upheld the
regulation in Associated HospitalServices, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213 (1980).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b); Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213
(1980). See also Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 C.B. 127.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b); Squire v. Student Book Corp. 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
84. Rev. Rul. 38-51, 1938-2 C.B. 166 ("What a corporation, exempt under [I.R.C. §
501(c)(3)], may do directly without forfeiting its right to exemption, it may do through a
corporation organized for that purpose, and ... a corporation so organized and operated is
entitled to exemption."); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (as amended in 1970). ("[E]xemption
will not be lost because, as a matter of accounting between the two organizations, the subsidiary
derives a profit from its dealing with its parent.").
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both an explicit and implicit manner. First, the provision contains an
explicit statement that "net earnings" from a tax exempt organization may
not "[inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." ' This
prohibition is generally referred to as prohibiting "private inurement."
Second, the enabling classifications of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) have been
interpreted as requiring that the organization be operated for public rather
than private benefit. 8 This requirement is referred to as the prohibition
against "private benefit." Both prohibitions prevent an exempt organization
from using its funds or assets other than in a manner which results in a
community benefit.
The private inurement prohibition is applicable only in a transaction
involving a "private shareholder or individual. 87 The regulation states that
the phrase refers to a person "having a personal and private interest in the
activities of the organization. " " In actual practice, the phrase, "private
shareholder or individual," has been applied to person having legal or
practical control over an organization's funds or assets.8" For this reason,
the private inurement prohibition is said to apply to transactions between
the organization and "insiders." Regardless of the term used, the
prohibition is designed to insure that private interests do not displace
public benefit.
The difficulty with the private inurement prohibition is in determining
when an organization is incurring a necessary expense or distributing "net
earnings" to an insider. In general, "net earnings" refers to the excess
remaining after an organization has used its funds or assets to obtain
necessary goods and services---gross revenue minus necessary expense.9°
Identifying "necessary expense," though, not only requires an objective
determination of what the organization needs in light of its charitable
purpose, but a subjective determination regarding how much the

85. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).

86. An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for [an exempt purpose]
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest Thus, to meet the requirement
of this subdivision, it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly by such private interests.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
87. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3); American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1982).
89. There are many cases which exemplify this principle. The educational and health care
cases include: International Postgraduate Med. Found. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1140
(1989); John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Lowery Hosp. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976); Harding Hosp. Inc. v. United States,
505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974); Birmingham Bus. College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.
1960); Texas Trade Sch. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 642 (1958); offd, 272 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.
1959); Horace Heidt Found. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 634 (Ct. Cl. 1959).

90.
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organization should pay for goods or services necessary to achieve the
charitable purpose."' For example, it may be objectively possible to
determine that an educational institution needs to hire workers to achieve
its charitable purpose and that paying workers therefore does not violate the
prohibition against private inurement. 2 It is more difficult, however, to
determine whether it is necessary to offer a salary measured in part by a
percentage of revenues in order to attract a necessary worker.93 The need for
the worker's skills is apparent and objectively measurable, but whether the
payment represents a necessary expense or a distribution of "net revenue"
requires a more subjective evaluation.
The private benefit prohibition is functionally related to the private
inurement prohibition but can apply to both insiders and those without
legal or practical control over an organization's funds or assets, in other
words, "outsiders." 4 The private benefit prohibition, however, is not
exclusively concerned with discrete transactions between the organization
and other parties, as is the prohibition against private inurement. Such
discrete transactions are certainly prohibited by the private benefit
prohibition. Courts also find a violation of the private benefit prohibition
when the number of persons benefited by an organization's activities is
limited by a barrier imposed by the organization itself, such as when an
organization provides goods or services solely to those with an ability to pay
a membership fee." In'that case, the facts support the conclusion that the
organization is operated not for the community's benefit in general, but
solely for the benefit of those who can afford the goods or services.
The various strategies employed by health center administrations
generally involve transactions in which large sums of money or expensive
assets are transferred between the academic health center and other parties,
either individuals or taxable entities. In addition, the aggressive and
fast-moving competition which characterizes the managed care environment

91. See, e.g., Texas Trade Sch., 30 T.C. 642 (1958).
92. See John MarshallLaw Sch., 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 19514; Birmingham Bus. College, 276
F.2d 476.
93. Thus, in enacting I.IC. § 4958 in 1996, Congress instructed the Treasury Department
to clarify whether and to what extent a compensation arrangement based upon an exempt
organization's revenues results in private inurement. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2) (Supp. 1996). Joint
IN104TH CONGRESS
Committee on Taxation, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ErMAC

57 (1996) [hereinafter Joint Committee]. ("The Treasury Department is instructed to issue
prompt guidance providing examples of revenue-sharing arrangements that violate the private
inurement prohibition."). For a discussion of revenue sharing as it relates to the private
inurement prohibition see Darryll K. Jones, Intermediate Sanctions,Revenue Sharing and Too
Many EO's Anyway, 69 TAX NOTES 1529 (1995).
94. American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1218 (3d Cir. 1993)

(holding that a precondition to the receipt of services or goods from an organization which is

"self-imposed" by the organization, results in private benefit.); Baltimore Health & Welfare Fund
v. Commissioner 69 T.C. 554 (1978) (limiting charitable services to union members only).
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make it difficult to identify objectively a good or service as a "need," and, if
so identified, the value of that "need" as it relates to health centers'
charitable purposes. Thus, the private inurement and private benefit
prohibitions are invariably implicated. The mandate for health centers,
therefore, is to have and maintain the ability to prove that the transfer of
funds or assets is justified in light of a needed good or service related to the
exempt purposes and therefore violates neither the private inurement nor
the private benefit prohibition.
C. Intermediate Sanctions, Excess Benefit Transactionsand Disqualified
Persons
The recent enactment of I.R.C. § 4958 increases the level of importance
attaching to the prohibition against private inurement."' If properly applied,
that provision will likely result in what is essentially a "safe harbor" with
respect to the prohibition. The cost, though, for that safe harbor is the
imposition of personal liability on insiders and organization managers' who
participate in a transaction resulting in private inurement."9 Thus, not only
must health center administrators apply the private inurement requirement
effectively in order to protect revenues from taxation, they must also do so
to avoid personal tax liability.
The potential safe harbor effect of I.R.C. § 4958 results from the adoption
and statutory definition of the terms, "excess benefit transaction" and
"disqualified person." Respectively, those terms are synonymous with and
remove a degree of subjectivity from the terms "net earnings" and "insider"
for purposes of the private inurement prohibition. Another indication of the
safe harbor effect is language in I.R.C. § 4958's legislative history which
allows for a relatively easily achievable rebuttable presumption that certain
transactions do not result in private inurement.
The term "excess benefit transaction" refers to a transaction in which the
exempt organization transfers funds or assets to a disqualified person but

97. Section 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1996 as part of the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights II. Pub. L. No. 104-168, Title XIII, § 1311(a), 110 Stat. 1475 (July 30,1996).

98. An organization manager is "any officer, director, or trustee of such organization (or any
individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees
of the organization)." I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2) (Supp. 1996).

99. Internal Revenue Code § 4958 imposes a two-tier penalty tax, triggered by the
occurrence of an "excess benefit transaction." First a tax equal to 25% of the "excess benefit"
is imposed on "disqualified persons," I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1), and a simultaneous tax equal to 10%

of the excess benefit is imposed on the organizational manager who willfully participated in the
excess benefit transaction without reasonable cause. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2). If the excess benefit

transaction is not undone to the extent possible, a tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit is
imposed on the disqualified person. I.R.C. § 4958(b). ("Excess benefit transaction," "excess
benefit," and "disqualified person" are discussed and defined infra).
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does not receive fair market value in return.1 " Thus, an organization that
pays too much, as measured by market standards, for a piece of land or
equipment engages in an excess benefit transaction if the seller is a
disqualified person." 1 Likewise, an organization that pays an unreasonable
salary to a disqualified person engages in an excess benefit transaction." 2
The definition of "excess benefit transaction" in I.R.C. § 4958 is thus
consistent with the subjective concept of "net earnings" which could only
be gleaned from the case law with relative uncertainty prior to the
enactment of I.R.C. § 4958.03
One significant aspect of I.R.C. § 4958 is that an insider cannot

retroactively justify the personal use of funds or assets by the argument that
if the value of the personal use of funds or assets were added to his or her
formally stated compensation, the total value would nevertheless be
reasonable and therefore not in violation of the private inurement
prohibition or I.R.C. § 4958.104 That argument is commonly made, for
example, where an organization is accused of violating the private
inurement prohibition because it pays the rent or living expenses of its chief

100. I.R.C. § 4958(c) states:
The term "excess benefit transaction" means any transaction in which an economic
benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to
or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services
received) for providing such benefit. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an
economic benefit shall not be treated as consideration for the performance of services
unless such organization clearly indicated its intent to so treat such benefit.
101. Joint Committee, supra note 93, at 57. "Thus 'excess benefit transactions' subject to
excise taxes include transactions in which a disqualified person engages in a
non-fair-market-value transaction with an organization or receives unreasonable
compensation." "Excess benefit" is the amount by which the exempt organization's transferred
assets or money exceeds the value of that given in return. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(B).
102. Id.
103. Compare the definition of "excess benefit transaction" with the discussion of "net
earnings" in John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9514 (Ct. C1.
1981) and Birmingham Business College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960).
104. "For purposes of [I.R.C. section 4958(c)(1) regarding the definition of an "excess benefit
transaction"], an economic benefit shall not be treated as consideration for the performance of
services unless such organization clearly indicated its intent to so treat such benefit." I.R.C. §
4958(c)(1) [last sentence].
[I.R.C. section 49581 specifically provides that the payment of personal expenses and
benefits to or for the benefit of disqualified persons, and non-fair-market-value
transactions benefiting such persons, will be treated as compensation only if it is
clear that the organization intended and made the payments as compensation for
services. In determining whether such payments or transactions are, in fact,
compensation, the relevant factors include whether the appropriate decision-making
body approved the transfer as compensation in accordance with established
procedures and whether the organization and the recipient reported the transfer as
compensation in accordance with established procedures to the extent required on
relevant forms (i.e., the organization's Form 990, the Form W-2 or Form 1099)
provided by the organization to the recipient, the recipient's 1040, and other returns.
JointCommittee, supra note 93, at 58.
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executive officer without an explicit agreement that such expenses were
intended as compensation." For the argument to work under I.R.C. § 4958,
the personal use must have been objectively intended as compensation at
the time the organization allowed the use."°e The argument that personal
use was intended as a part of the disqualified person's compensation cannot
be made retroactively when the intent was not demonstrably present at the
time of the personal use.1 1 7 Thus, if the intent to allow personal use cannot
be demonstrated as one which arose at or prior to the time of personal use,
the organization is viewed as having distributed funds or assets without
obtaining fair market value in return, even though the organization may
later show that recipient's services were worth the additional compensation
represented by the personal use of funds or assets."r The primary effect of
this requirement is to place prospective limits on the use of an
organization's resources such that the possibility of an indefinite drain on
those resources is eliminated.
Internal Revenue Code § 4958(f)(1) defines "disqualified person" as any
person or entity "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
affairs of the organization"0' and is therefore consistent with the theme
which underlies the definition of "insider" in private inurement cases. 1 0

105. Plaintiffs hardest-pressed contention is that although corporate earnings may have
been used to pay personal expenses of the Fensters [who controlled the organization],
there was no inurement of income to them, because had such amounts been included
in salaries, Theo. Fenster's total salaries would not have resulted in unreasonable
compensation.
John MarshallLaw School, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9514.
106. Joint Committee, supra note 93, at 58. ("An organization cannot demonstrate at the time
of an IRS audit that it clearly indicated its intent to treat economic benefits provided to a
disqualified person as compensation for services merely by claiming that such benefits may be
viewed as part of the disqualified person's compensation package. Rather, the organization
would be required to provide substantiation that is contemporaneous with the transfer of
economic benefits at issue.") Id.
107. Id.
108. In such a case, the organization and organization manager could face penalties for
failure to withhold and remit employment taxes, in addition to the tax imposed by I.R.C. § 4958.
See I.R.C. § 6672.
109. Internal Revenue Code § 4958(0 states:
(1) The term "disqualified person" means, with respect to any transaction(A) any person who was, at any time during the 5-year period ending on the date
of such transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
affairs of the organization.
(B)a member of the family of an individual described in subparagraph (A), and
(C) a 35 percent controlled entity.
A "35-percent controlled entity" is essentially a business organization, 35% or more of which
is owned by persons specified in I.R.C. § 4958(0(1)(A) or (B). I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2)(A).
110. Compare the definition of "disqualified person" in I.R.C. § 4958(f) with the "insiders"
in International Postraduate Med. Found. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1140 (1989); John
Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) V9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Lowery Hosp.
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976); Harding Hosp. Inc. v. Unted States, 505 F.2d 1068
(6th Cir. 1974); Birmingham Bus. College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960); Texas
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Unlike suggestions made prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 4958,
disqualified person status is not conditioned upon the person holding a
particular title or position at the time of the transaction, but on the extent
to which a person actually has substantial control of the organization.111 In
particular, and most significant for health center administrators, the legisla-

tive history rejects the argument that physicians are disqualified persons

merely by virtue of their status as physicians." 2 A physician is thus treated
as any other person or entity connected to the exempt organization and
must actually possess substantial influence over the organization's affairs
to be considered a disqualified person.
The last safe harbor aspect of I.R.C. § 4958 is the establishment of

procedures which result in a rebutable presumption against the finding of
a private inurement/excess benefit violation and, thus, shield the
organization, its managers, and disqualified persons from incurring tax
liability. The presumption arises if the transaction is approved by an
independent governing body that relies upon legitimate data as to fair
market value, and adequately documents the basis for approving the
transaction."' 3 If the procedures are implemented, a rebuttable presumption
Trade Sch. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 642 (1958) affd, 272 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1959); Horace
Heidt Gound. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 634 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
111. I.R.C. § 4958(f0(1); Joint Committee, supra note 93, at 59. Note that a person may not
possess the required control at the time of the transaction but if, at any time within a five year
period ending on the date of the transaction, the person possessed the control, the person is
nevertheless a disqualified person. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A).
112. Joint Committee, supra note 93, at 59 n.42. ("The IRS has issued a general counsel
memorandum indicating that all physicians are considered "insiders" for purposes of applying
the private inurement proscription. The Congress intended that physicians will be disqualified
persons only if they are in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an
organization.").
113. Existing tax law standards (see I.R.C. § 162) apply in determining reasonableness
of compensation and fair market value. [footnote omitted]. In applying such
standards, the Congress intended that the parties to a transaction are entitled to rely
on a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect to a compensation
arrangement with a disqualified person if such arrangement was approved by a board
of directors or trustees (or committee thereof) that: (1) was composed entirely of
individuals unrelated to and not subject to the control of the disqualified person(s)
involved in the arrangement [footnote omitted]; (2) obtained and relied upon
appropriate data as to comparability (e.g., compensation levels paid by similarly
situated organizations, both taxable and tax-exempt, for functionally comparable
positions; the location of the organization, including the availability of similar
specialties in the geographic area; independent compensation surveys by nationally
recognized independent firms; or actual written offers from similar institutions
competing for the services of the disqualified person); and (3) adequately documented
the basis for its determination (e.g., the record includes an evaluation of the
individual whose compensation was being established and the basis for determining
that the individual's compensation was reasonable in light of that evaluation and
data). If these three criteria are satisfied, penalty excise taxes could be imposed
under the [statute] only if the IRS develops sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the
probative value of the evidence put forth by the parties to the transaction (e.g., the
IRS could establish that the compensation data relied upon by the parties was not for
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that the prohibitions have not been violated applies both to compensation
arrangements with, as well as the purchase of goods or services from,
disqualified persons."' The commendable aspect of the procedures by
which the presumption arises is that they provide protection merely from
the adoption of common sense and good management practice. The
protection does not require extraordinary measure or procedures which
would not otherwise be implemented.
Health center administrators will find that I.R.C. § 4958 is particularly
helpful with regard to acquisitions of primary care physicians and practices.
Because primary care physicians are the most important actors in the
managed care environment, they are in high demand and therefore have the

leverage to demand lucrative compensation arrangements for their services
and practices.

Section 4958 will allow health center administrators to

compete for those services and practices without the burden of subjectivity

which previously characterized private inurement jurisprudence.
D.

The UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax

The unrelated business income tax contained in I.R.C. § 511 through
I.R.C. § 513 is implicated by health center strategies designed to cope with
the managed care environment because those strategies often involve the
systematic selling of goods or services to other entities which are not the
health center's charitable beneficiaries.1 " Unlike the private inurement/

functionally comparable positions or that the disqualified person, in fact, did not
substantially perform the responsibilities of such position). A similar rebuttable
presumption would arise with respect to the reasonableness of the valuation of
property sold or otherwise transferred (or purchased) by an organization to (or from)
a disqualified person if the sale or transfer (or purchase) is approved by an
independent board that uses appropriate comparability data and adequately
documents its determination.
Joint Committee, supra note 93, at 58-59.
114. Id. The legislative history also confirms that reasonable compensation may be
determined by reference to compensation paid by comparable taxable and tax exempt
organizations. Id. at 58 n.35. Additionally. the legislative history states that the fact that
compensation was approved by a state or local legislative agency or body does not mean the
compensation does not result in an excess benefit transaction for purposes of I.R.C. § 4958. Id.
at 59, n.37.
115. Internal Revenue Code § 511 imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income
of both private and public colleges and universities. I.R.C. § 512 defines unrelated business
taxable income as:
[Tihe gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business
(as defined in section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed by
this chapter which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or
business ....
Internal Revenue Code § 513(a) defines an unrelated trade or business as:
[Any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from
the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits
derived] to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable,
educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption
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excess benefit prohibition, though, the unrelated business income tax is
implicated even when the health center receives fair market value in
exchange for its goods or services. The underlying theory is that exempt
organizations should not engage in activities resulting in competition with
taxable organization."' Thus, the tax is not concerned with the fairness of
the transaction from the organization's viewpoint, but whether the
organization ought to be engaged in the transaction while enjoying a tax-free
status. The analysis revolves around the degree to which an exempt
organization is engaging in activities and adopting practices commonly
associated with taxable entities.117 If the activities and practices are
commonly associated with taxable entities, the organization is presumed to
be in competition with taxable organizations and will be taxed unless it can
show that the activities are "substantially related" to the achievement of its
exempt purpose.' Since health center strategies are essentially borrowed
from the taxable economy and indeed seek the same market share as that
sought by taxable organizations, the unrelated business income tax is
invariably implicated.
The key element in avoiding the unrelated business income tax is the
determination of whether an activity is "substantially related" to the
organization's charitable purpose. This, too, is a subjective determination
which depends upon the facts and circumstances in a particular instance.
The regulations specify, though, that an activity is substantially related to
an exempt purpose only when it "contributes importantly to the
accomplishment" of that purpose."" There must be a "causal relationship"

under section 501 (or, in the case of [a public college or university] to the exercise or
performance of any purpose or function described in section 501(c)(3)) ....
116. See American Bar Endowment v. United States, 477 U.S. 105, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
"The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of
unfair competition." H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319 (1950), reprintedin 1950-2 C.B. 380, 409; S. Rep.
No. 81-2375 (1950), reprintedin 1950-2 C.B. 483, 504.
117. See Iowa State Univ. v. United States, 500 F.2d 508, 517-521 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
118. Id.
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). Whether an activity is "substantially
related" to an exempt purpose depends upon the particular importance of the activity to the
accomplishment of the exempt purpose. Id. The regulation discusses the requirement in broad
esoteric form:
Trade or business is related to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only where
the conduct of the business activities has causal relationship to the achievement of
exempt purposes (other than through the production of income); and it is

substantially related, for purposes of section 513, only if the causal relationship is a
substantial one. Thus, for the conduct of trade or business from which a particular
amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to purposes for which
exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance
of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly
to the accomplishment of those purposes. Where the production or distribution of
the goods or the performance of the services does not contribute importantly to the
accomplishment of the exempt purposes of an organization, the income from the sale
of the goods or the performance of the services does not derive from the conduct of
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between the activities and the accomplishment of the exempt goal.12 In
most instances, then, the determination of a substantial relationship
depends upon a case-by-case identification of an organization's exempt
purpose, and a "but-for" type of analysis which asks whether the activities
are important to the achievement of the purpose.1 2
1 22
Treasury regulation 1.502-1(b), discussed in a different aspect above,
provides a certain level of objectivity to the unrelated business income tax
by providing definite rules in certain instances. First, the regulation
provides that selling goods and services to unrelated exempt organizations
is never substantially related to the selling organization's goals, even though
the selling and purchasing organizations have identical goals. 2 ' Thus, an
exempt health center which regularly sells diagnostic services and supplies
to an unrelated health center is engaging in an activity which is not
substantially related to the seller's educational purpose, even though the
seller furthers the common goal of educating health professionals within the
community by engaging in the activity. 24 In that case, the selling
organization would be subject to unrelated business income tax. Second,
a health center which sells necessary goods and services to its parent or
sister organization is always engaging in an activity substantially related to
the seller's exempt purpose.12 5 Thus, a health center which regularly sells
diagnostic services and supplies to its sole parent organization, or to a
corporation under the same exclusive control as the buying corporation (i.e.,
a sister corporation) is engaging in an activity which is substantially related
to the seller's charitable purpose. The unrelated business income tax would
therefore not apply.
As a practical matter, health center teaching, research, and educational
endeavors will suffer unless health centers adopt the competitive business
principles underlying managed care. On the other hand, I.R.C. § 511
through 513, and Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b), impose legal restrictions
on the type and scope of health center business strategies. As a result,
health center administrators must understand and comply with those
restrictions if they are to avoid engaging in activities which reduce revenue
and therefore prove counterproductive to their survival strategies. Indeed,

related trade or business. Whether activities productive of gross income contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is
granted exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved.
Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. See also Hi-Plains Hosp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 528 (1982) ("The regulations thus
require a case-by-case identification of the exempt purpose, an analysis of how the activity
contributes to that purpose and an examination of the scale on which the activity is
conducted.") Id.
122. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b). The regulation is quoted supra note 80.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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the restrictions underlying each of the tax enabling and enforcement
provisions dictate common limitations on the strategies which may be
employed by health center administrators. Regardless of the particular facts
and circumstances, health center administrators may not adopt a strategy
which conveys too much private benefit on a taxable entity or private
individual, nor may the strategy transform the tax exempt entity into
something which is practically indistinguishable from a taxable entity.
Given the business savvy imperatives of managed care, these limitations
present difficult barriers for health center administrators.
III.

TAX REQUiREMENTS AND MANAGED CARE STRATEGIES

Environmental scientists know that despite their destructive effect,
naturally occurring forest fires are beneficial and even necessary from time
to time. In the absence of such "wildfires," old, dormant and tangled
undergrowth would slowly strangle the forest and thereby impede the
regeneration necessary to its survival. The scorched ground resulting from
wildfires eventually becomes fertile acreage for new, stronger, and more
robust vegetation and animal life. In hindsight, social scientists might view
the spread of managed care in a likewise manner. Like a wildfire, managed
care will have left a scorched health care environment in its wake. Had the
managed care movement not occurred, the health care system would surely
have suffocated under its own bloated and expensive weight. In the long
run, the destruction wrought by managed care will have resulted in a
regeneration characterized by new, stronger, and more robust forms of
health care institutions, including stronger academic health centers.
Section I discussed the "physical dynamics," as it were, of the managed care
wildfire. Section II discussed the general tax principles which will shape
the regeneration of the health care system. This Section considers the
particular manner in which general tax principles effect the regeneration of
academic health centers in the managed care environment.
A.

PrimaryCarePhysician and PracticeAcquisitions

Understandably, the acquisition of primary care physicians and primary
care physician practices is one of the most common strategies employed by
academic health centers in the managed care environment. Since health
centers traditionally lack the very resource most sought after and relied
upon by managed care organizations (primary care physicians), health
centers are recruiting those physicians and their practices literally by the
dozens.128 The recruitment and compensation of those physicians and the
purchase of primary care physician practices raise issues regarding the
health center's tax exempt purpose and the prohibitions against private
benefit, private inurement and excess benefit transactions. Thus, the

126. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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recruitment of primary care physicians and the purchase of their practice
assets, an activity which addresses health centers' greatest need, involves
much more than a simple handshake between the health center and the
physician.
In the midst of the managed-care dominated health care environment, the
Service has begun to pay close attention to the recruitment of physicians by
tax exempt organizations.12 By "recruitment," the Service means more
than routine or normal hiring, but instead the use of taxable and nontaxable
fringe benefits, in addition to formal salary, to lure physicians to the
organization's use and benefit. The benefits include signing bonuses,
payment of professional liability insurance, the provision of office space at
below market rent, income and mortgage guarantees, start-up financing, and
moving expenses.12 The Service does not state the extent to which all or
some of the benefits are permissible in a particular situation. Permissible
recruitment is, instead, a function of what a reasonable manager might offer
under the same circumstances.129
The Service's analytical method first isolates recruitment as a separate
and distinct activity and then asks whether and to what extent that activity
furthers the purpose for which the organization is tax exempt. " ' Thus, the
Service analyzes recruitment in the same manner as it would the sale of a
tangible good or service. For example, the sale of pharmaceutical products
is analyzed as a distinct activity jn light of its furtherance of the charitable
provision of health care."' If the sale of such products does not further the
exempt purpose, the sale is viewed as a nonexempt activity which, if
engaged in to a substantial degree, will cause the organization to lose its tax
exempt status.

127.

The Service's first real discussion of physician recruitment is contained in the Hospital

Audit Guidelines. I.R.S. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59. In 1994, the Service required

the public release of a closing agreement between the Service and an exempt hospital deemed
to have engaged in improper physician recruitment. Internal Revenue Service ClosingAgreement
with Hermann Hospital, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 200, at L-1 (Oct. 19, 1994) [hereinafter
Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement]. In another 1994 enforcement action, the Service

revoked a health care organization's tax exempt status because of alleged improper recruiting.
Tech. Adv.

Mem.

94-51-001 (Apr. 14, 1994). Thereafter, the Service issued proposed

physician recruitment guidelines. I.R.S. Announcement 95-25, 1995-14 I.R.B. 11. The
proposed guidelines were amended and issued in final form in Revenue Ruling 97-21, 1997-18
I.R.B. 8.
128. Rev. Rul 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. 8.

129. In order to determine that a recruiting incentive is reasonable, it should be linked
to the physician's value to the hospital (e.g., a new service or enhanced productivity)
or community (e.g., a needed specialty) and all incentives considered must not
exceed a reasonable amount. In addition, the type of practice, the physician's
experience, and comparative incomes must be considered.
I.R.S., Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59.
130. See generally Hermann HospitalClosingAgreement, supra note 127; Rev. Rul. 97-21,
supra note 128.
131. See Hi-Plains Hosp. v. Commissioner, 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982); Carle Foundation
v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979); Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-1 C.B. 242.
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Analyzing physician recruitment in such a manner is at first blush rather
puzzling, since hospitals necessarily require physicians. Engaging in any
sort of analysis seems obviated by that very apparent fact. As mentioned
earlier, though, the furtherance analysis is imposed as a method by which
the activities of tax exempt organizations are limited to those that are
demonstrably necessary to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose. This
limitation prevents the activities of exempt organizations from becoming so
pervasive that they are unnecessarily harmful to taxable entities. With this
in mind, one can speculate as to the Service's concerns regarding physician
recruitment as it relates to an organization's exempt purpose.
When viewed as a distinct activity, similar in nature to the selling of
goods or services, the acquisition of physician services is correctly
considered an activity which can be harmful to taxable entities. This is
especially true when coexisting, taxable health care providers are
attempting to secure the same commodity (i.e., primary care physicians), but
must do so with after-tax dollars while an exempt organization may do so
with tax-free dollars.132 In the absence of a relationship between
recruitment and the accomplishment of a charitable goal, recruitment in
such an environment seems unnecessary from a social policy viewpoint and
predatory from the viewpoint of taxable entities within the same market.13
As such, recruitment unrelated to an exempt purpose calls into question the
purpose for which the organization is organized and operated. The
competitive effect from recruitment is no less harmful when the relationship
between the activity and the goal is apparent, but in that instance the
relationship proves the organization's exempt purpose and the societal
benefit from achieving the goal outweighs the harm to taxable entities. The
Service's analysis thus looks for proof that recruitment, while it may'harm
taxable entities, furthers an exempt purpose and thereby justifies the harm
to taxable entities.
The Service has never explicitly stated its reliance on the above-stated
reasoning, but the reasoning is apparent in Revenue Ruling 97-21134 and in
the Herman Hospital Closing Agreement.13 Both the Revenue Ruling and
the Closing Agreement treat recruitment as a discrete activity which must
be analyzed in terms of the degree to which it is necessary to the
accomplishment of an exempt purpose. Thus, the analysis in Revenue
Ruling 97-21, for example, begins with a determination of whether

132. "The tax-free status of section [501(c)(3) organizations enables them to use their profits
tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits
remaining after taxes." H.R. REP. No. 81-2319. (1950), reprintedin 1950-2 C.B. 380, 409; S. REP.
No. 81-2375 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 504.
133. For a discussion of the unrelated business income tax from an economic viewpoint,
including the effect of predatory actions by tax exempt organizations see Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and CorporateIncome Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017
(1982).
134. 1997-18 I.R.B. 8.
135. Hermann Hospital ClosingAgreement, supra note 127.
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recruitment furthers the rendition of health care services.13 Consistent
with its long-held view that health care delivery is the defining purpose of
nonacademic health centers, the Service requires a showing that the
community in which the organization is located suffers from a shortage of
needed health care. 13 7 In the absence of a proven shortage, the Service views
recruitment as unnecessary to the exempt purpose and therefore a
nonexempt activity.
An interesting variable with respect to the furtherance analysis concerns
the degree to which recruitment actually satisfies a need once the need has
been proven. In the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement, the Service not
only imposed a requirement that the shortage be proven before the
organization could engage in recruitment, it also strongly implied that
recruiting from within a hospital's own community does not address the
need and therefore is impermissible. Instead, the Closing Agreement
allowed recruitment only with respect to new graduates or physicians who
were not already practicing in the community.138 In general, this restriction
" 139
is consistent with the furtherance analysis because "cross-town
recruiting would not seem to reduce the overall need within that
136. Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. 8. The ruling sets forth five hypothetical fact situations
and then analyzes the permissibility of recruitment in each situation. In the situations in which
recruitment was considered permissible, the Service began by identifying the need for
recruitment. Id. In the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement, the Service prohibited
recruitment unless the hospital proved one or more of the following:
a. a population to physician ratio in the community that is deficient in the particular
specialty (with reference to the ideal ratio set forth in GMENAC reports) of the
physician being recruited;
b. demand for a particular medical service in the community coupled with a
documented lack of availability of the service or long waiting periods for the service,
if the physician is being recruited to increase availability of that service;
c. designation of the community (or that portion of the community that the physician
is serving) at the time the recruitment agreement is executed as a Health Professional
Shortage Area (HPSA) as defined in 42 CFR 5.1-5.4;
d. a demonstrated reluctance of physicians to relocate at the Hospital due to the
Hospital's physical location (this criterion is intended to refer to a hospital located in
a rural or economically-disadvantaged inner-city area);
e. a reasonably expected reduction in the number of physicians of that specialty
serving in Hospital's service area due to the anticipated retirement within the next
three year period of physicians presently in the community; or
f. a documented lack of physicians serving indigent or Medicaid patients within
Hospital's service area, provided that newly-recruited physicians commit to serving
a substantial number of Medicaid and charity care patients.
Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement, supra note 127, at L-3.
137. Hermann HospitalClosing Agreement, supra note 127, at L-3.
138. The Service defined a "permissible recruit" for purposes of the Closing Agreement as
"(i)... a recent graduate of a residency or fellowship program, whether or not in the Hospital's
community, or (ii) [a physician who] has not previously practiced in the Hospital's community
or been affiliated with another hospital serving all or part of the Hospital's community." Id.
139. Michael W. Peregrine &T.J. Sullivan, IRS Issues FinalPhysician Recruitment Revenue
Ruling: Focus on Process and Community Benefit Continues, 16 ExEMPr ORG. TAx REv. 1031,
1033 (1997).

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 24, No. 2

community. Such recruiting would normally only result in a redistribution
of resources within that community.
Under certain circumstances, though, even cross-town recruitment can
further an exempt purpose. In Situation 3 of Revenue Ruling 97-21, the
Service determined that it was permissible for an organization to recruit a
physician already practicing in the community.' In that case, though, the
hospital demonstrated a need for a physician willing to treat Medicaid
patients. Assuming the existence of an oversupply of physicians within the
community willing to treat non-Medicaid patients, cross-town recruitment
resulted in an efficient reallocation of physician resources within the
community, and thus furthered the hospital's charitable purpose without
harming the overall delivery of health care within the community.1 " The
same cannot be said for Situation 4 in Revenue Ruling 97-21. In that
instance, a hospital recruited a radiologist from another hospital within the
community. The recruiting hospital needed a radiologist to assist in the
operation of its radiology department, but there was no indication that the
recruiting hospital was otherwise meeting an unmet need within the
community by reallocating an oversupply of physicians to an under-served
exempt purpose. Instead, the recruiting hospital merely increased its
particular ability to benefit the community at the expense of the losing
hospital's ability to benefit the community. As such, the recruitment in
Situation 4 seemed more like the predatory activity harmful to taxable
entities. Nevertheless, the Service considered recruitment in that instance
justified by a demonstrated need.
Despite its theoretical weakness, Situation 4 represents the best hope for
health centers engaged in recruitment activities when recruitment is viewed
in light of nonacademic hospital precedents. Situation 4 is most relevant
and helpful precisely because it does not require a shortage of health care
providers within the community, but merely a shortage within an existing
facility. More importantly, the recruiting hospital may satisfy that shortage
from within the community and at the expense of another hospital. In
typical situations, health centers too can demonstrate a particular shortage
of primary care physicians within the health center system, even though the
community may not be experiencing such a shortage. If it can be believed,
Situation 4 thus allows health centers to recruit primary care physicians
from within the community and for its own use and benefit, without a
showing that the recruitment results in an efficient reallocation within the
community.
A better approach, though, would be to analyze academic health center
recruiting in light of the tri-part basis of their tax exempt status. The
Service's analysis to date is entirely devoted to nonacademic health centers
which achieve tax exempt status almost exclusively as a result of health care
140. 1997-18 I.R.B. 8.
141. The Hospital Audit Guidelines, supra note 127, state that "enhancing productivity"
justifies recruitment and therefore might apply to Situation 3.
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delivery. As emphasized earlier, the exempt purpose of academic health
centers includes scientific research and education, in addition to health care
delivery. The scientific research and education purposes absolutely require
sufficient numbers of clinical faculty who can demonstrate and supervise
patient care and assist in the conduct of research by providing health
centers with real patients. Thus, there may be no shortage of primary care
physicians within a health center's community, as is generally required
under Revenue Ruling 97-21, but recruitment might still be necessary to the
achievement of a health center's exempt purposes. Relying on health
centers' tri-part basis for tax exempt status is thus more theoretically sound
than reliance on the questionable finding of community need in Revenue
Ruling 97-21's Situation 4.
An astonishing fact pattern described in Technical Advice Memorandum
(TAM) 94-51-001 provides a good reference for discussion of the ways in
which physician recruitment and practice acquisitions can result in
violations of the private inurement, private benefit, and excess benefit
prohibitions. According to the TAM, the North Miami General Hospital,
Inc. (the Hospital) operated a 359-bed acute care and teaching hospital from
1961 until February 1984.141 In 1984, the hospital sold its assets and
reorganized itself into an integrated health care system known as Modern
Health Care Services, Inc. Modern Health Care's Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) also served as a trustee for Modern Health Care, as well as a trustee
for Modern Health Care's sole parent corporation. In addition, Modern
Health Care's CEO was also the CEO of a captive insurance company owned
by Modern Health Care's parent organization. In 1988, Modern Health Care
paid its Chief Executive Officer a salary of $266,667, plus $78,000 in
premiums for an insurance policy owned by the CEO. In addition, the CEO
received a $120,000 salary from the captive insurance company.
The
Service found that the "normal" compensation for large hospital CEOs in the
relevant market ranged from $110,000 to $262,395 and that the CEO lacked
the skill or training which would permit him to act as CEO for an insurance
company.
The TAM also detailed various food, liquor, and travel expenses paid by
Modern Health Care on behalf of the CEO, his wife, and Modern Health
Care's Executive Vice President/Treasurer. Modern Health Care asserted
that the expenses were related to business entertainment and consulting,
but the Service noted a lack of documentation with respect to the business
entertainment or consulting endeavors.

142. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-51-001 (Apr. 14, 1994). A technical advice memorandum is a
written opinion issued by the Service's national office to one of its district or appellate offices
in conjunction with an examination of or administrative appeal by a taxpayer. MICHAEL I.
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3-54 (1991). Although binding on the district to which
it is issued, a technical advice memorandum may not be cited as precedent in another
proceeding. I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
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In 1986, and as part of its reorganization efforts, Modem Health Care
Services began to purchase existing private medical practices and hiring the
practices' former physician-owners to provide medical services on behalf of
Modem Health Care. In one instance, Modem Health Care purchased a
practice for $6,000,000 in reliance on its appraiser's estimate that the
practice was worth $6,800,000. The Service's appraiser, however, found
that at the time of the purchase, the practice was worth only $2,000,000.143
After the purchase, the five physicians who formerly owned the practice
were hired to perform services on behalf of Modem Health Care at salaries
which exceeded their income prior to the sale by roughly 100%, even
though the physicians performed the same duties both before and after the
sale, and which exceeded the industry norm by 50%.
From 1986 until 1991, Modem Health Care spent $17,400,000 to
purchase seven medical practices and six other unspecified health care
centers. In 1992, Modem Health Care's appraiser valued the practices and
health care centers at $7,328,564. Despite that appraisal, Modem Health
Care sold the practices and health centers to a limited partnership, seventy
percent of which was owned by thirteen physicians employed by Modern
Health Care, for a promissory note with a face value of $4,500,000. Less
than six months after payments on the promissory note were to begin,
Modem Health Care wrote off all but approximately $254,000 of the note
due to "doubtful collectibility."
In June, 1994 the Service notified Modem Health Care that it had violated
the private benefit and private inurement prohibitions and therefore would
no longer be recognized as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 1'" Although
the facts arose prior to the effective date of I.R.C. § 4958, they provide a
useful demonstration of how that provision might work as well as the
application of the private benefit and private inurement prohibition.
The Service began its analysis by identifying those persons considered
"insiders" for purposes of the private inurement prohibition and who would
be considered "disqualified persons" for purposes of I.R.C. § 4958. It is easy
enough to conclude from the that Modem Health Care's CEO and its
Executive Vice President/Treasurer were insiders, as the Service so
concluded." They both served as trustees and the TAM indicates that they
both possessed and exercised control over Modem Health Care's assets. It
follows that they exercised "substantial influence" over Modern's Health
Care's affairs and therefore meet the definition of disqualified persons.'"
Less obvious "insiders" and "disqualified persons" included the CEO's wife,
the physician employees, and the limited partnership which the physician

143. Modem Health Care's corporate minutes indicated a "conscious overpayment" for the
practice. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-51-001 (Apr. 14, 1994).
144. Modem Health Care is challenging the revocation in the Federal Claims Court. LAC
Facilities Inc. v. United States, No. 94-604T (Federal Claim filed Sept. 14, 1994).
145. These officers also met the definition of "organization manager." See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2).
146. I.R.C. § 4958(0(1).
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employees substantially owned. The CEO's wife was an insider because of
her family relationship to a person having control over Modem Health
Care's assets.147 For the same reason, she was a disqualified person for
purposes of the intermediate sanction penalty.1" The Service concluded
that the physicians were insiders because they "controlled the flow of
patients" to Modem Health Care. This conclusion is consistent with the
Service's long held, but Congressionally rejected theory that all physicians
are presumptively deemed to be insiders. " " Depending on the size of and
manner in which an organization operates, control over the flow of patients
may be a sensible indication that a physician is in a position from which
she or he may substantially influence the organization's affairs. But in a
large health care organization employing hundreds of physicians and
extending practice privileges to many more, it is difficult to justify a blanket
conclusion that a single physician can substantially influence the affairs of
the organization. Unfortunately, the TAM does not sufficiently address this
point; it merely states that control over the flow of patients is sufficient to
confer insider status. Assuming the TAM correctly considers the
physicians to be insiders and, by implication, "disqualified persons," leads
to the identification of the final disqualified person for purposes of I.R.C. §
4958. Since the physicians owned more than thirty-five percent of the
is a "35-percent controlled
limited partnership, the limited partnership
15
entity" and therefore a disqualified person. 1
Having identified insiders and disqualified persons, the Service than
isolated the transactions which resulted in private inurement and, again by
implication, would result in an excess benefit transaction under I.R.C. §
4958. Recall that net earnings may "inure" to an insider through the
payment of unreasonable compensation or through the personal use of an
organization's assets or funds. 51 Under I.R.C. § 4958, an excess benefit
transaction results when an organization pays too much, as measured by
reference to fair market value, for a good or service. 15' The Service stated
that Modern Health Care paid far in excess of fair market value for the
services rendered by its physician employees and by its CEO. The Service
also cited the expenses incurred for food, beverage, and travel as examples
of private inurement. In addition, the Service ruled that Modem Health

147. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
148. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(B).
149. See supra note 112.
150. I.R.C. § 4958(0(1)(c). Even if the physicians were neither insiders nor disqualified
persons, transactions between them and the organization in which the organization receives less
than fair market value would result in a prohibited private benefit.
151. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
152. See supr notes 100-103 and accompanying text. "The fair market value is the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." Treas. Reg. 1.170A- 1(c)(2).
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Care paid too much for physician practices and then sold the practices and
other assets for too little.
In terms of the private inurement prohibition, the overpayment for assets
and employee services, the personal use of assets, and the selling of assets
at below market rates means that Modern Health Care spent money
unnecessarily and therefore the expenditures constituted distributions of
net earnings. In the language of I.R.C. § 4958, the activities resulted in a
transfer of assets without the receipt of fair market value in return. In the
latter instance, all those involved would have been subject to extreme
penalties if I.R.C. § 4958 had been enacted prior to the transactions."' 3 It is
impossible to know whether the glaring violations described in the TAM
resulted from Modem Health Care's early, aggressive, and clumsy attempts
to deal with managed care or simply from greed and the intoxication of
money. Regardless, the lessons contained in the Modern Health Care TAM
are valuable to health centers aggressively pursuing primary care physicians
and their practices in an effort to remain viable in the managed care
environment.
The obvious lessons in Technical Advice Memorandum 95-41-001, that
an exempt organization ought to get its money's worth, is not as important
as the not so obvious lesson. Throughout the TAM, the Service cited to
Modem Health Care's lack of documentation to support assertions regarding
the appropriateness of various expenditures. For example, Modern Health
Care could not produce documentation to support its assertion that food and
beverage expenses were incurred in conjunction with legitimate business
activities or that its CEO performed services justifying an additional salary
from Modern Health Care's related insurance company. When Modern
Health Care did obtain documentation, such as an appraisal of practice
assets it intended to sell, it nevertheless entered into transactions
inconsistent with the documentation. The Service cited the lack of
documentation more than once, as though the failure of documentation, per
se, established the prima facie case. The focus on documentation, i.e., the
process by which an exempt organization enters into a transaction, is
consistent throughout the legislative and administrative process concerning
153. Take the physician practice assets and health centers, for example. The organization's
appraiser valued the assets at $7,328,564. The organization sold the assets to a limited
partnership (a 35% owned entity under I.R.C. § 4958(f)1](C)] essentially for $254,000. Because
the organization failed to get fair market value and the transaction involved a disqualified
person, the transaction is within the definition of an excess benefit transaction. I.R.C. §
4958(c)(1). The excess benefit is therefore the difference between the value of the assets' fair
market values and the consideration recieved for the assets, or $7,074,564. I.R.C. §
4958(c)(1)(B). As a disqualified person, the limited partnership is liable for a first tier tax equal
to 25% of the excess benefit, or $1,768,641. As organization managers under I.RC. § 4958(f)(2),
the CEO and Treasurer are also subject to a first tier tax equal to 10 percent of the excess
benefit, or $707,456.40. If the transaction is not corrected (presumably by rescinding the
transaction or amending the transaction to provide for a secured payment of the assets' fair
market value), the limited partnership would be subject to the second tier tax equal to 200% of
the excess benefit, or $14,149,128. I.R.C. § 4958(b).
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the private benefit, private inurement and excess benefit prohibitions. For
example, the legislative history of I.R.C. § 4958 provides a substantial
amount of protection when certain documentation is obtained and, of
course, relied upon with respect to a transaction. Fringe benefits, for
example, must be documented contemporaneously with the receipt of such
benefits or they will be treated as an excess benefit.15 A compensation or
purchase arrangement which is determined after a process which includes
a documented market comparison by an independent body will protect the
organization and its officers from tax liability. 55 Both Revenue Ruling 97-21
and the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement impose requirements in every
case that compensation arrangements be fully integrated into a written
contract and that all recruitment packages be approved by the governing
board or a committee or individual designated by the governing board.
Finally, the Service has cited with approval an exempt organization's
adoption and periodic governing board review of internal physician
recruitment guidelines. Of course, documentation is only effective when it
is implemented. But as a practical matter, the lack of documentation with
respect to a transaction involving an insider or disqualified person, in itself,
is evidence of a private inurement or benefit violation, or an excess benefit
transaction. 5 The effect of a failure of documentation, then, is the most
important lesson of Technical Advice Memorandum 95-41-001.
B. Joint OperatingAgreements
In the language of managed care, primary care physician and practice
acquisitions are aimed at vertical integration. That is, a health center brings
sufficient numbers of primary care physicians and clinics into its own
internal structure such that the health center increases its ability to offer a
full range of medical services and is thereby less dependent upon
outsourcing. The ultimate intent is that the health center gain the ability to
cost-effectively offer the wide range of services necessary to thrive in the
managed care environment. The main constraint to vertical integration is
its high capital investment requirements. A health center must have a
sufficient reserve or funding source before it can engage in wholesale hiring
of physicians or purchasing of physician practices. Rapidly increasing the
number of primary care physicians, as some health centers are doing, places
concomitant demands on physical plant and eventually requires the
expenditure of capital to adequately house and equip the newly acquired
physicians. As a result, some health centers are unable to achieve vertical
integration, or are unable to rely solely on vertical integration as a method
of survival in the managed care environment.
154. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 113.
156. In the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement, the Service stated that the failure to
comply with the written agreement requirement, in itself, can constitute private inurement or
private benefit. Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement supra note 127, at L-5.
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A less expensive path to the cost-effective offering of divergent health
care services is through horizontal integration, which involves the creation
of alliances with other health care providers in an effort to consolidate the
provision of various services not available from any one member of the
alliance. Through such alliances, a health center gains the ability to offer
a wide range of services without having to invest the capital necessary to
vertical integration. For example, a health center oriented towards acute
care can gain access to and offer primary care by joining an alliance with
hospitals or other health care providers with a wider ability to render
general health care, but an insufficient ability to offer acute care. Alliance
participants also benefit through an ability to consolidate administrative
functions and thereby achieve an economy of scale. Thus, an alliance
consisting of four hospitals can contribute to and utilize the services of a
single legal or personnel department rather than each hospital maintaining
its own such departments. The resulting advantage is not available using
the vertical integration approach, which generally results in greater
administrative support costs.
The primary methods of achieving horizontal integration include joint
operating agreements between unrelated tax exempt health care
organizations and joint ventures between tax exempt and taxable health care
organizations. Both forms of alliances create issues with regard to a health
center's exempt purpose, the private benefit prohibition, and the unrelated
business income tax. Joint operating agreements are discussed here, while
joint ventures are discussed in Section III C. below.
An understanding of the joint operating agreement building blocks begins
with further analysis of Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b). Enacted in
'
conjunction with Congressional efforts to prevent "unfair competition,"157
the regulation states that an organization which provides goods or services
exempt organizations is not engaged in a
to one or more unrelated
charitable activity or an activity which furthers an exempt purposes, even
if the providing organization engages in no other activities.15 That is, an
organization the sole purpose of which is to assist exempt organizations is
not entitled to tax exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 159 The regulation
also provides that an already exempt organization which provides goods or
services to unrelated exempt organizations, even those with identical
exempt purposes, engages in an unrelated business trade or business for
In essence, the regulation conclusively
purposes of I.R.C. § 513.160
presumes that acting as a consolidation entity for unrelated exempt

157. For the history of Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b), see Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 217-21 (1980).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b). The regulation is quoted in full at footnote 80.
159. Id. This prohibition has not always applied. In Revenue Ruling 69-572, 1969-2 C.B.
119, for example, the Service granted tax exempt status to an organization the sole purpose of
which was to provide rental space exclusively to unrelated exempt organizations.
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b).
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organizations results in unfair competition and should therefore be
prohibited.161 Thus, an exempt hospital that agrees to provide a certain
diagnostic procedure for other unrelated exempt hospitals is engaging in an
unrelated trade or business.
The significant exception to the regulatory pronouncements is that an
organization which provides goods and services solely to its parent or sister
exempt organizations is entitled to exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
provided the goods or services are necessary to the parent or sister
organization's exempt purpose;. 2 if an already exempt organization engages
in the same activity with respect to an exempt parent or sister organization
it will not be engaged in an unrelated trade or business."' 3 The exception
is based upon a common sense recognition that dealings between parent or
sister corporations are economically equivalent to one large corporation
doing business with itself, notwithstanding the legal fiction of corporate
separateness, and therefore does not create unfair competition.1 Thus, an
exempt hospital that agrees to provide a certain diagnostic procedure solely
to its parent or sister organization is not engaged in an unrelated trade or
business.
Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b)'s requirement that alliance participants
be related imposes a significant but not insurmountable barrier on health
centers which seek consolidation with other exempt health care providers.
The Service does not require the formal parent-subsidiary relationship
discussed in the Regulation, and which might result from a legal merger, but
it does require a level of formal interconnectedness between the parties such
that the result has come to be known as a "virtual merger."6 s That term
applies to a contractual relationship-the joint operating agreement-the
effect of which closely resembles a legal merger, but which does not involve
a transfer of legal title, or the formal relinquishment of separate corporate
Once implemented, a joint operating agreement allows the
identity."a
formally unrelated exempt parties to provide necessary goods and services
to each other without engaging in an unrelated business.
To be effective, a joint operating agreement must result in a parent-type
organization which exercises operational and financial control over all the
161. For an in-depth critique of this conclusion and the theoretical underpinning of Treas.
Reg. § 1.502-1(b) see Darryll K. Jones, Creating Complex Monsters: Joint OperatingAgreements
and The Logical Invalidityof TreasuryRegulation 1.502-1(b), 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 563 (1997).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b).

163. Id.
164. See supra note 84; see also Tress. Reg. § 1.502-1(b). ("[E]xemption will not be lost
because, as a matter of accounting between the two organizations, the subsidiary derives a profit
from its dealing with its parent.").
165. Roderick Darling & Marvin Friedlander, Virtual Mergers-HospitalJoint Operating
AgreementAffiliations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1996 EXEMr ORGANIZATIONS CONTIWMG
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK 132 (1996). ("Because

a joint operating agreement affiliation is not a true merger, it has come to be called a 'virtual
merger.'") The IRS textbook is an internal manual used by the Service to train its personnel.
166. Id.
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participants." 7 By imposing common control similar to that applying to
parent, subsidiary and sister corporations, the joint operating agreement
brings the participants within the rationale of Treasury Regulation 1.5021(b), which, in allowing the tax free exchange of goods and services,
recognizes as a practical matter that goods and services are in effect being
transferred within a single entity. 8 Thus, the joint operating agreement
must result in the appearance of a single entity even though the parties do
not intend an actual merger or a formal parent-subsidiary relationship.
The Service has promulgated what is essentially a checklist for the proper
drafting of an effective joint operating agreement. " ' The checklist sets out
the indicia of common control which the Services believes necessary to
achieve the parent-subsidiary-sister-type relationship contemplated by
Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b). The Service emphasizes, however, that no
single fact or pattern of facts is required in every case. Instead, the totality
of the facts and circumstances must demonstrate a common source of
control over the alliance participants such that the several formally
unrelated alliance members constitute the functional equivalent of a single
organization.170
The first indicator of common control is the delegation of "significant
management responsibility" to a central governing organization (commonly
referred to as a "joint operating company").'" The joint operating company

167. If the equivalent of a parent-subsidiary relationship is established, dealings
between the parent and the subsidiary that would not otherwise have resulted in
unrelated trade or business are considered to be merely a matter of accounting...
Joint operating agreements between or among previously independent hospitals and
hospitals systems usually do not provide the "parent" authority over boards of
Therefore, the Service must look for other explicit
directors and assets.
manifestations of control so dealings between the hospitals (and the parts of the
hospital systems that are completely financially integrated) under the agreement are
between organizations that are the equivalent of a parent and its subsidiary and thus
not unrelated trade or business.
Id. at 134.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 134-36.
170. The... facts and circumstances provide the basis for more flexible control analysis
that does not rely strictly on the degree of structural control or any one factor.
Although some factors are more significant than others, the analysis looks to a
preponderance of all the facts and circumstances that demonstrates significant
control over management and financial decisions which have been ceded by
participating entities to a governing body under a joint operating agreement or a
"super" parent organization. There may be other facts and circumstances that have
not been listed and they too will be considered if raised by organizations.
Id. at 135.
171. Significant management authority may be demonstrated by the following:
(1) Authority to establish budgets. This significant aspect includes responsibility to
establish overall budgets, as well as authority to approve major expenditures, debt,
contracts, managed care agreements, and capital expenditures. This aspect also
considers whether the JOA governing body regularly meets to establish long term and
short term budgets and to implement its decisions.
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must have concrete authority not only over long range plans, but also over
"day-to-day" management decisions. A second indicator considers the ease
with which a joint operating agreement may be dissolved or a participant
may withdraw from the joint operating agreement.172 The easier it is to
dissolve or withdraw from a joint operating agreement, the less logical it is
to view the alliance as the functional equivalent of a single organization. For
example, the existence of informal dispute resolution procedures,
particularly binding arbitration, makes it more difficult for a participant to
withdraw from the joint operating agreement, and thereby provides a level
of permanence coming closer to that found in an actual merger. The third
indicator is whether any particular participant reserves significant power
unto itself. 73 The recitation of this factor includes a statement, however,
that the reservation of power based upon a participant's ethical, moral or
religious philosophy is permissible.174 The final factor looks to whether any
participant may exercise routine veto power over decisions made by the

(2) Authority by the JOA governing body to monitor and audit each participating
entity's compliance with its directives. This is a significant aspect.
(3) Authority to direct services. This significant aspect considers whether the JOA
governing body can direct that health care services be undertaken or not be
undertaken by the participating entities. For example, whether the governing body
of the JOA can direct a participating hospital to refrain from being a provider of
pediatric services.
(4) Authority to enter agreements that bind participating entities, particularly
agreements with managed care providers.
(5) Authority to hire and fire personnel.
(6) Authority to grant hospital staff privileges.
(7) Authority to set or approve fees and prices.
(8) Authority to buy assets for and sell assets of participating entities.
(9) Authority to re-allocate income among the participating entities to balance income
and expenses to assure financial integration and to achieve mutual objectives.
Id. at 136.
172. Factors that establish a permanent arrangement include whether there are
significant penalties or other hindrances to terminating the agreement, and whether
there are mechanisms such as direct negotiations and binding arbitration in place to
resolve disputes among the parties. The degree to which the JOA is permanent also
effects the determination whether the JOA establishes the equivalent of a
parent-subsidiary relationship.
Id. at 136.
173. If participating hospitals retain some authority, this is not necessarily
determinative of whether the equivalent of a parent-subsidiary relationship has been
established. For example, authority over ethical or moral issues based on religious
principles may be reserved by the participating entities. If all of the other
surrounding facts and circumstances showed that sufficient authority had otherwise
been ceded to the JOA governing body, this type of reservation would not preclude
a finding that the equivalent of parent-subsidiary relationship had been established.
Id.
174. Id.
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common governing body."" If so, then authority really hasn't been ceded to
the consolidation entity since any one party might thwart the joint operating
company's authority. The indicia set out by the Service are not exclusive;
there may be other factors which in particular cases demonstrate the
necessary control.
There are no cases, statutes or regulations specifically addressing joint
operating agreements. Instead, the Service has demonstrated the applicability of the joint operating agreement requirement exclusively through
private letter rulings.17 The most instructive ruling for purposes of this
article is Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 96-51-047. In that ruling, the Service
addressed a joint operating agreement involving the University of Cincinnati
Hospital, the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine and three other
unrelated, tax exempt, nonacademic health care organizations. 77 Assuming
that substantial overlap existed with regard to services offered by each
participant, the presence of five free-standing hospitals within a single
health care community implies an inherent degree of unnecessary overhead
and service duplication. It is also safe to assume that the oversupply of
services within the community provided a significant degree of leverage for
managed care organizations, since no single health care provider could
provide a wide enough variety of services such that it could negotiate
effectively with managed care organizations. These assumptions likely had
their harshest effect on the University of Cincinnati Hospital and College of
Medicine, to the extent the Hospital and College of Medicine operated in the
175. A veto power is not the same as a power to initiate an action. If authority ceded
to the JOA governing body is merely the power to veto actions taken by participating
hospitals, then the facts and circumstances necessary to establish the equivalent o
a parent- subsidiary relationship would not be present. Similarly if actions of the
JOA governing body are not subject to veto by the participating hospitals, this too
would negate a finding that the hospitals function as subordinates of the JOA.
Id.
176. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-22-042 (Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-21-031 (Feb. 26, 1997): Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 97- 18-022 (Feb. 4, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-16-021 (Jan. 17, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
97-14-011 (Dec. 24, 1996); Priv. Lir. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996). A private letter rulings is
a written opinion issued to a particular taxpayer interpreting the tax effect of a stated fact
situation. 26 CFR § 601.201(a)(2) (1997). It may not be cited as precedent by persons other
than the taxpayer to whom it is issued. I.RC. § 6110j)(3) (1997). Nevertheless, in the absence
of statute, case law, regulation or revenue ruling, it provides nonprecedential guidance as to the
Service's view of certain transactions. Private letter rulings are published by commercial
publishers such as Commerce Clearing House, Inc. and Prentice-Hall, Inc.
177. Before the Service releases private letter rulings, it deletes the names of persons or
entities involved as well as geographical or other information which might suggest the identity
of those involved. Thanks are owed, however, to Ms. Kathleen Bruvold, Associate General
Counsel at the University of Cincinnati for providing the author with a copy of the joint
operating agreement involved in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 [hereinafter GreaterCincinnatiJOA].
A copy of the agreement is on file with the publisher. The other health care organizations
involved in that ruling were The Christ Hospital, a 501(c)(3) organization having its principle
offices in Cincinnati, Ohio, St. Luke's Hospital, a 501(c)(3) organization having its principle
offices in Ft. Thomas, Kentucky, and Jewish Health Systems, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization
having its principle offices in Cincinnati, Ohio. GreaterCincinnati1A, supra at 73.
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manner typical of academic health centers. Thus, consolidation can be
assumed to have been beneficial to all participants, but especially the
University of Cincinnati.
As a matter of tax law, the resulting joint operating agreement expertly
addresses the issues raised by the interaction of academic health center
operations, exempt qualification requirements and the realities of managed
care. Significantly, the agreement explicitly adopts and recites the three
bases of tax exemption applicable to academic health centers, and does not
simply rely on health care delivery as its justification. 17 In the language of
managed care, the agreement also establishes that the primary motivation
for the alliance was "enhancing the availability, efficiency, and economy of
hospital facilities and the services rendered thereby, by providing for
cooperation of hospital agencies and the utilization of shared facilities and
services to obtain economies in operation and more effective health
service."17 Likewise, the agreement explicitly states that the alliance
participants sought to create an integrated health care system which could
reduce costs and thereby remain viable in a managed care environment
focused on capitation arrangements.""0 The drafters therefore seemed fully
cognizant of the importance of articulating the alliance goals using language
particularly relevant to tax exemption requirements.
The agreement negotiates the barriers of Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b)
in an equally comprehensive manner. The alliance participants created a
joint operating company which possessed almost all the powers which a
governing board might have over a single entity,181 including the power to

178. The Alliance is intended to further the charitable, educational and scientific
missions of the JOC and the Participating Entities, with respect to teaching, research
and meeting the health care needs of the communities served by the Participating
entities.
id. at 12.
179. Id. at 2.
180. To enhance the general health status of the communities by developing the
capabilities to manage enrollee health care costs through risk-sharing arrangements
including capitation; offering new methods of health care delivery including
wellness, preventative health initiatives and patient satisfaction measures.
Id. at 13.
181. 3.3 Role of the Joint Operating Company Board. The JOC Board, subject to certain
powers reserved to the Participating Entities, shall have responsibility for the overall
management and supervision of the JOC and its affiliates, including but not limited
to the operation of the Alliance, in furtherance of the purposes set forth in the
Articles of Incorporation, including but not limited to the power to:
3.3(a) Establish appropriate policies and strategic direction to enhance the Alliance
to function as an integrated health care delivery system providing a full range of
health care services without regard to race, creed, color, national origin or economic
status.
3.3(b) Facilitate cooperative and collaborative efforts by and among the Participating Entities with respect to the provision of health care services, including but not
limited to efforts to enhance existing health care delivery facilities and systems and
establish efficient and economical systems of health care delivery operating on an
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retain all net revenues generated by individual participants and to redirect
those revenues where needed among the alliance participants.18 2 The joint
operating company also had the authority to require the relocation of
physical plant and equipment belonging to alliance participants in order to
effectively achieve alliance goals.183 Additionally, the joint operating
company had the authority to approve budgets for individual participants
and the overall alliance;' the joint operating company had authority to
appoint the chief operating officer for each participating hospital, enter into
contracts binding each alliance participant, determine which participant
would provide certain services, establish priorities, and make strategic plans
for the alliance.8 " These powers addressed the Service's "significant
management responsibility" factor rather handily and thus resulted in the
single entity appearance required of Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b).
The other indicators listed by the Service generally concern the extent to
which the delegation of significant management responsibility in the joint
operating agreement is limited through the inclusion of certain reservations
or the easy ability to dissolve the agreement. As with the first factor, the
joint operating agreement addresses these requirements in a manner which

integrated basis and providing a continuum of care;
3.3(c) Reduce the cost of the delivery of health care services and otherwise effect
efficiencies and economies of scale in the delivery of health care services by the
Participating Entities;
3.3(d) Enhance the health status of the community by developing and offering new
and/or expanded health care services, including but not limited to wellness programs,
preventive health initiatives and services, and community and patient need and
satisfaction assessments;
3.3(e) Govern the Alliance and provide health care services in a non-discriminatory
manner for the benefit of all persons in the community, including the indigent and
those persons whose care is paid for in whole or in part through government
sponsored programs such as Medicare or Medicaid;
3.3(f) Develop, promote, operate and/or support educational and scientific research
activities and programs through the Alliance in furtherance of the general health of
the communities served by the Alliance;
3.3(g) Review and approve financial and strategic plans and operating and capital
budgets for the Alliance to be developed and implemented by JOC management,
including issuance of all debt;
3.3(h) Enter into contracts on behalf of the Participating Entities with respect to the
organization and operation of the Alliance;
3.3(i) Hire, evaluate and compensate the JOC CEO and participate in the selection
of the other senior management of the Alliance; and
3.3() Do all other things necessary and appropriate to carry out the duties and
responsibilities of the JOC in governing, managing and operating the Alliance and
achieving its strategic goals consistent with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement.
id. at 14-15.
182. Id. at 21-22.
183. Id. at 19.
184. See infin note 181.
185. See infra note 181.
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demonstrates an awareness of the theory behind Treasury Regulation
1.502-1(b). For example, the joint operating agreement allows a participant
to withdraw from the agreement when changes in applicable law effect the
alliance's operations, but then only after a ninety day negotiating period
designed to adjust the alliance's operation consistent with law. 186 In
addition, a participant may withdraw when another participant breaches an
obligation imposed by the agreement, but only after negotiation and
arbitration. 87 The Service ruled that these limitations essentially addressed
the second and third indicators discussed above.
The final indicator, the reservation of rights or veto power, creates special
issues when the joint operating agreement involves an academic health
center. Academic health center administrators quite correctly resist the
notion that management and control of academic affairs be relinquished to
an outside authority. Thus, the joint operating agreement in PLR 96-51-047
provided and the Service agreed that the College of Medicine would not be
subject to the joint operating company's authority, but would retain
exclusive authority with respect to academic decisions affecting the
College.'88 The agreement also provided for special budgetary procedures
with respect to College of Medicine funding and budgeting processes. 8 9
Although the Service did not specifically address these reservations, its
overall approval provides some assurance that an academic health center
need not relinquish any degree of academic control in conjunction with a
joint operating agreement.
As a result of its approval, any entity within the alliance could provide
services for or on behalf of any other entity. By the terms of the approved
agreement, the joint operating company occupied the position of parent
corporation, while the University of Cincinnati and other participants
occupied the position of subsidiary and sister corporations. Thus, the
participants achieved consolidation and a degree of integration just as if
they comprised a single entity or several entities connected through formal
stock ownership. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.502-1(b), the joint
operating company is entitled to tax exempt status, even though its sole
function is to provide services for legally unrelated exempt entities.
Likewise the already exempt alliance members do not engage in unrelated
business through the provision of goods and services to other alliance
participants as they otherwise would under the regulation.
C.

Joint Ventures

The second and theoretically more worrisome method by which an
academic health center may achieve horizontal integration involves joint

186. GreaterCincinnatiJOA, supra note 177, at 61.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 20-21.
189. Id. at 25-29.
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venture arrangements with for-profit health care organizations. That is, a
health center might join or form a partnership or limited liability company
(LLC) with a for-profit entity with respect to a single health center function
(i.e., the joint operation of free standing psychiatric unit) or with respect to
the health center's entire operations (i.e., the joint operation of an entire
teaching hospital). The principle advantage of such arrangements is the
resulting access to capital, assets and business savvy which a for-profit
health care provider can bring to the bargain. The principal disadvantage
of such arrangements, and the one which should concern health center
administrators most, is the potential that the joint venture is formed or
operated in a manner which does not further the health center's exempt
purpose, or which results in an impermissible private benefit for the
for-profit co-venturer. Since these potentialities necessarily remain
throughout the term of the arrangement-as part of the joint venture's
continuing operations-joint ventures require constant tax monitoring and
oversight.
Prior to 1980, the Service considered an exempt organization's
participation as a general partner in such an arrangement as impermissible,
per se. The Service believed that since a general partner owed a fiduciary
duty to the interests of the for-profit limited partners, it could not possibly
operate exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose."° That view was
rejected, however, in Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner.191 There,
the Service denied tax exempt status for a theater group which entered into
a limited partnership with a for-profit corporation to produce a play.192 The
theater group served as the general partner, while the for- profit corporation
was a limited partner."' 3 After reviewing the details of the agreement the
Tax Court stated that the theatre group was not organized or operated for the
for-profit corporation's private benefit and therefore was entitled to exempt
status.' In particular, the Court noted that the theater group's contribution
to the partnership was made pursuant to an "arm's length transaction," that
the group did not subject the entirety of its operations to the partnership,
and that the limited partners did not control the theater's operations.195
While Plumstead is significant in its recognition that an exempt
organization may act as a general partner in a partnership with for-profit
entities, the opinion does not sufficiently explain the concerns raised by
such joint ventures. The Court does not address the conflict between an
exempt organization/general partner's duty to maximize profits for the
limited partners and the duty to act in furtherance of the exempt purpose

190. Rochell Korman & William F. Gaske, Joint Ventures Between Tax-Exempt and
Commercial Health CareProviders, 75 TAX NOTES 1575, 1585 (1997).
191. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), affd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
192. Id. at 1325.
193. Id. at 1328.
194. Id. at 1334.
195. Id.
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which, under tax law, must be superior to a purely profit-making
motivation. The fact that the agreement was negotiated at arm's length, to
the extent the recitation of that fact includes a finding that the exempt
organization's partnership interest was purchased for fair market value,
addresses one aspect of the private benefit prohibition. That is, the fact
suggests that the exempt organization received quid pro quo such that it
cannot be said that its funds or assets are used, as a result of undue
influence or poor management,"'0 to the economic benefit of a private
interest. But the Court did not explicitly make that point. Likewise, the fact
that the exempt organization acts as general partner might be an indication
that the for-profit corporation is submitting itself to the exempt organization's tax exempt motivation and method of operating rather than vice-versa,
but the Court did not explicitly make that point either.197 The theoretical
worries with respect to joint ventures were instead left for exploration under
subsequent fact situations.
In response to Plumstead,the Service began to apply an analysis which
addressed the theory left unexplored by the Tax Court. The Service now
considers joint ventures in which an exempt organization acts as general
partner permissible when doing so furthers the organization's exempt
purpose, does not convey an unnecessary benefit on a private party, and
does not prevent the organization from acting in exclusive furtherance of its
exempt purpose.1' These are intensely fact specific requirements and as a
practical matter require prior Service approval before a joint venture can be
implemented.1" As a result, there are many private letter rulings exemplifying permissible joint venture arrangements. z°
Private Letter Ruling 95-17-029 is one of the most instructive and helpful
rulings for academic health centers. 0 1 In that ruling, a 501(c)(3) university
operated a medical school and was affiliated with two hospitals owned by
a for-profit entity. The university's affiliation with the two hospitals began

196. Cf. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-51-001 (Apr. 14, 1994) (finding that tax exempt health care
organization managers' undue influence and poor management resulted in private benefit).
197. In Bob Jones University Museum and Gallery, Inc. v. Commissioner,69 T.C.M. (RIA)
96,247 (1996), the Tax Court stated that whether a board is controlled by a for-profit entity is
relevant only when the exempt organization and the for-profit controlling entity engage in
transactions resulting in unreasonable compensation for goods and services. This suggests that
an exempt organization's board might be exclusively controlled by a for-profit entity as long as
transactions between the exempt and for-profit organizations do not result in private inurement.
198. Korman & Gaske, supra note 190, at 1585.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1583. The authors provide a useful chart showing the general facts involved in
23 private letter rulings.
201. Pri. Ltr. Rul. 95-17-029 (an. 27, 1995). Other private letter rulings addressing academic
health centers include Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-19-044 (Feb. 18, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-32-014 (Apr.
9, 1984). Private Letter Ruling 95-17-029 is thought to involve a joint venture between
Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska and American Medical International, Inc.. Elizabeth
Mills, Whole HospitalJoint Raise QuestionsAbout Exemption, 7 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORGS. 204, 207
n.7 (1997).
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in 1892, but the hospitals were owned by the for-profit entity only since

1984. After the for-profit entity purchased the hospitals, the university and
for-profit entity began to have conflicts concerning hospital operations. The
conflicts threatened the continued viability of both parties and ultimately
resulted in litigation between the parties. To resolve the conflicts, the
parties proposed that the university would purchase one of the hospitals
and contribute it to a limited liability corporation formed with the for-profit
entity which would contribute the other hospital along with unspecified
clinics it previously owned. The for-profit entity would act as the manager
of the LLC's day-to-day operations for a fee consistent with reasonable
hospital management fees, but would have to get the university's consent
with respect to unspecified "major decisions." In addition, the agreement
prohibited the for-profit entity from operating the LLG in a manner
inconsistent with tax exemption requirements.
The Service's approval of the LLC arrangement, and particularly its
analysis of the manner in which the LLC furthered the university's exempt
purpose, strongly supports academic health centers. Unlike arrangements
involving nonacademic health centers," 2 the analysis in PLR 95-17-029
focused exclusively on the university's educational and scientific basis for
tax exemption. Thus, the university did not show a need for more health
care within the community, but specifically relied upon the need to assure
its access to patients necessary to its medical school's teaching and research.
This significant recognition underscores the importance of not relying solely
on the precedents applied to nonacademic hospitals, especially when an
academic health center is simply unable to demonstrate an unavailability
of health services within its community.
Having determined that the LLC furthers the university's tri-part basis for
tax exemption, the Service further analyzed the arrangement to determine
whether impermissible private benefit resulted, and whether the for-profit
entity's profit-making motivation co-opted the university's exempt purpose
motivation. With regard to the first consideration, the Service noted that the
LLC was formulated through arms-length negotiations and that the
university received fair market value in return for its initial contribution to
the LLC. It also concluded, without much analysis, that the LLC would
operate in a manner which maintained the university's control over its
operations. Thus, the university's participation in the LLC would not be
o
operated pursuant to the co-venturer's profit motivations.
The Service's application of the Plumstead factors, to date, have been
within the context of joint ventures involving one of an exempt
organization's various functions. The Service has not yet released an
analysis of a joint venture in which an exempt organization subjects the
entirety of its functions to the control of a joint venture managed or operated

202. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-014 (Nov. 26, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-45-018 (Aug. 8,
1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-16-005 (Dec. 19, 1995).
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2 ' involve the
by a for-profit entity. These "whole hospital joint ventures""
same exempt purpose and private benefit issues as single purpose joint
ventures, but to a much greater degree. In single purpose joint ventures, the
exempt organization's remaining assets and operations are not subject to the
for-profit's use and benefit. Therefore, it is easier to conclude that the
for-profit entity's profit motivation is not co-opting the exempt
organization's exempt purpose motivation. In addition, the for-profit does
not invariably profit from the unlimited use of the exempt organization's
exempt status and assets. In whole hospital joint ventures, these
conclusions are not so readily apparent.
Although not yet approved, a proposed joint venture agreement between
University Medical Center, Inc. (UMC), a tax exempt health care
organization, and Columbia Jacksonville Healthcare Systems, Inc.
(Columbia), exemplifies the concerns related to whole hospital joint
ventures. 2 It also demonstrates how the presence of the Plumstead factors
may be insufficient to guard against the encroachment of profit motivations
into the actions of an exempt organization." 5
The UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement involved a private, tax
exempt health care organization, financed by governmental bonds which
served as a teaching hospital for the University of Florida. The agreement
recited that the joint venture was undertaken in response to the increasing
consolidation occurring within the relevant market and as "the best method
for assuring the continuation of [UMC's] health care and teaching
mission."2 The agreement provided that both UMC and Columbia would
contribute the use of their respective hospitals and other assets to the
partnership. The partnership's governing board consisted of five persons
appointed by UMC (Category A governors) and five persons appointed by
Columbia (Category B governors)." 7 Overall governing power would be

203. Korman &Gaske, supra note 190, at 1584.
204. I wish to thank Ms. Linda B. Miller, President of Volunteer Trustees of Not-For-Profit
Hospitals, Washington, D.C., for providing me with a copy of the agreement. [Hereinafter
UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement] (on file with the author).
205. For a review of state law efforts to restrict or prohibit whole hospital joint ventures see
Michael C. Fondo &Christopher M. Jedrey, States Move to Limit joint Ventures with For Profit
Health Care Providers,7 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORGS. 3 (1997).
206. WHEREAS, [UMC], after witnessing the formation of several multi-hospital health
care provider networks in the First Coast region, has concluded that participation in
a geographically disbursed integrated health care delivery system is the best method
for assuring the continuation of the [UMC Entities' health care and teaching missions
UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement, supra note 204, at 3. This particular provision is
quoted because of its contrast to the provisions justifying the alliance in the Greater Cincinnati
JOA. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text. Although the UMC-Columbia Joint
Venture Agreement may have been motivated by the same managed care issues motivating the
Greater Cincinnati JOA, the actual agreement devotes too little attention to a recitation of the
charitable, educational, and scientific justifications for the joint venture.
207. UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement, supra note 204, at 14.
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exercised equally by the two categories of governors and the agreement
provided for a detailed negotiation and mediation procedure in the event of
a deadlock.' The profits and losses realized through the partnership would
be distributed to the parties in accordance with the value of the assets
contributed to the partnership's use." 9 As part of the agreement, the parties
entered into a service contract appointing Columbia as the manager of
UMC's hospital.21 UMC would nevertheless maintain control over hospital
operations, approval of medical staff, and quality control.211 The agreement
also provided that neither party could operate any health care facility
outside the terms of the joint venture and that any subsequent facilities
acquired by either party within the geographical limits of the agreement
would be operated as part of the joint venture.1 2 In broad general terms, the
parties stipulated that funding of University of Florida academic programs
at UMC's hospital remained an important endeavor and would not be
negatively affected by the partnership.2 1 Finally, the agreement provided

208. Id. at 28-29. The provision requires that each category of governors will first negotiate
in good faith. If the dispute is not resolved within thirty days, a single representative from each
category negotiates for another 30 days. Either category of governors may veto the resolution
decided upon by the two representatives, in which case (or in the event the representatives
cannot reach agreement), the dispute is subject to 30 day formal mediation. If that fails, the
parties must attempt to reach a resolution through informal mediation. If an agreement is still
not reached within fifteen days of the start of the informal mediation, either party may file suit.
Id.
209. UMC's initial profit share was 22%, Columbia's profit share was 78%. The disparity
in profit share was not an issue in Plumsteadwhere the exempt group's profit share was 25.5%
and the for-profit partner's share was 63.5%. Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 1324, 1328 (1980), affd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). In that case, though, the agreement
was for a single purpose rather than the exempt organization's entire activities.
210. UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement, supra note 204, at Exhibit B (Interim
Management Service Agreement).
211. Id.
[UMC] shall at all times retain control over: the operation of the Hospital and related
facilities; the approval of medical staff; the quality of care rendered in the Hospital
and related facilities as required by applicable law; and governance and decision
making with respect to the functions of the [UMC] Board of Directors.
Id.
212. UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement, supra note 204, at 67.
213. The Joint Venturers acknowledge the existence of the Affiliation Agreement
[between UMC and the University of Florida] and recognize the value this academic
relationship currently brings to UMC. The Joint Venture endorses and supports an
academic tie with the University of Florida. In stating its recognition and support of
the academic mission of the University of Florida to the Joint Venture, the Joint
Venturers intend to conduct themselves in a way as to not advantage or disadvantage
one medical staff of a Facility in relationship to the medical staffs of the other
Facilities. Moreover, it is anticipated that UMC will continue its fiscal support of the
University of Florida's academic programs.
Id. at 36. The quoted provision contains the essence of the agreement's recitation of the
educational purpose served by the alliance. As noted above, supra note 204, the agreement
does not sufficiently concern itself with the exempt purposes which underlie the grant of tax
exempt status.
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that the partnership could not be operated in a manner which violated
requirements for UMC's tax exempt status or result in unrelated business
taxable income.2 1' The UMC-Columbia partnership agreement thus
contained the factors relied upon in Plumstead and subsequent private letter
rulings issued by the Service. The parties submitted the agreement for
approval to the Service, but after more than a year had elapsed, the Service
had not ruled on the agreement and the parties withdrew the application for
Service approval.
The reason's for the Service's reluctance to approve the agreement despite
its compliance with prior analysis is purely a matter of speculation but is
most likely the result of the "whole hospital" nature of the agreement.
Whatever the reason, the Service's reluctance to approve whole hospital
joint ventures where the exempt organization submits its entire operations
to the shared control and use of a for-profit entity is justified. When an
exempt organization subjects the entirety of its operations, assets, and
governance to the use or control of a for-profit entity, the for-profit entity
invariably reaps a substantial benefit from every single activity engaged in
by the exempt organization. 15 In the UMC-Columbia Joint Venture
Agreement, this result seems all the more likely since the agreement
prevents UMC from engaging in any other related exempt activity except in
conjunction with the for-profit partner."' It seems unlikely, too, that the
invariable benefit is or can be commensurate with the societal benefit
underlying the grant of tax exemption and ostensibly resulting from the
joint venture. This is so even if the exempt organization receives fair market
value for its contribution, or the joint venture agreement reserves unto the
exempt organization a veto power or other mechanism designed to ensure
the joint venture operates in accordance with an exempt purpose."1 7 It is not
214. UMC-Columbiajoint Venture Agreement, supra note 204, at 15.

215. The UMC-Columbia Joint Venture Agreement has received public opposition stressing
this and other objections:
[UMC would be operated as one part of a larger for-profit enterprise, whose purpose
would be to maximize over-all economic return, not to serve UMC's charitable
mission. Moreover, there are no assurances or safeguards that in the event of conflict

between economic return and service to the community, mission would come first.
Letter from Linda B. Miller, President, Volunteer Trustees of Not-For-ProfitHospitals,to Donald
C. Lubick, Esq., Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Departmentof the Treasury and Marcus S.
Owens, Director, Exempt Organizations Division, InternalRevenue Service 2 (July 17, 1996) (on
file with the author).
216. See supra text accompanying note 212.
217. One writer argues that the joint venture agreement deprives UMC of its ability to
exercise control over its exempt purpose:
The venture would strip UMC of its essential right to exercise control and supervision
over its own affairs. It would require UMC's board to relinquish the basic rights of
corporate governance: its ability to fire, select, or even review its own manager (who
is a related party to Columbia); its ability to "maintain ... and change cultural
characteristics of the charity; its autonomy in decisions regarding the institution's
capital expenditures, consolidation or expansion of services; and its right to
renegotiate key agreements with third parties."
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that the exempt organization receives too little for its value or even that the
organization acts in accordance with the co-venturer's profit motive. It is
that with every single activity of the exempt organization (rather than a
single, limited endeavor), the for-profit entity gains an exponentially
increasing amount of tangible and intangible benefit from its association
with the exempt organization. Not only does the increase subject the tax
exemption to indefinite private benefit, it increases the harm to the
remaining taxable community, which must compete with the for-profit
co-venturer without the vicarious tax exempt benefits resulting from the
joint venture. These benefits include grants, loans, and other financing
made available to the exempt organization as a result of its tax exempt
status, but indirectly used on a wholesale basis by the for-profit entity via
the joint venture. Additionally, the for-profit entity gains access to the
exempt organization's goodwill and fundraising mechanisms. Even if
accounted for by way of an increase in the exempt organization's profit
share, the for-profit is significantly advantaged, and other taxable entities
are disadvantaged, by the increasing strength of the joint venture resulting
from the exempt organization's status and community standing. Thus, the
presence of Plumstead's protective factors are insufficient to prevent the
overwhelming use of tax exempt status to benefit a private interest.18

Miller, supra note 215, at 2. Another writer makes a similar point:
In sharp contrast to nonprofit/for-profit joint ventures involving ancillary services like
MRI facilities-transactions quite properly approved by the Service in recent years
-nonprofit participants in whole hospital joint ventures transfer ownership of their
core hospital assets to joint ventures effectively controlled by for-profit partners.
Local hospital management and staff become accountable primarily to the for-profit
manager, rather than to the nonprofit board. The nonprofit's continuing influence
over hospital operations by virtue of its representation on the joint venture board is
too attenuated to ensure that the assets it has contributed to the venture will be used
for charitable purposes and not for private benefit.
Letter from C. Thomas Smith, President and CEO, VI-IA, Inc., to Marcus Owens, Director,
Exempt Organizations Division, Internal Revenue Service, with copy to Donald C. Lubick, Esq.,
Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury (Dec. 10, 1996) (on file with the
author). I tend to disagree with the characterization of the agreement by both writers to the
extent they suggest that the particular joint venture agreement divests UMC of its ability to
devote its activities to its exempt purpose or that it loses the ability to govern itself. See supra
text accompanying note 211 (regarding UMC's authority to operate the hospital as it deems
appropriate); See also supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (regarding UMC's equal
representation and authority on the board). Even if it did, those deficiencies could be easily
corrected. Nevertheless, as I argue in the text, whole hospital joint ventures are generally
inconsistent with the policy underlying the grant of tax exemption even when the exempt
organization maintains control over its operations.
218. In Bob Jones University Museum and Gallery,Inc. v. Commissioner,69 T.C.M. (RIA)
96,247 (1996) the Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that a for-profit's involvement in
the operation of an exempt organization results in an impermissable "aura" for the for-profit.
In that case, though, the for- profit entity appointed a minority of the board. Id.
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Tax Exempt Health Maintenance Organizations

As if to come full circle, the final strategy considered concerns an
academic health center's ownership interest in a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO). Such a strategy may be implemented using a
for-profit entity, such as a partnership or LLC between an academic health

center and a for-profit insurer organization, or a tax exempt entity wholly
owned by the academic health center. The principles stated above with
respect to joint ventures also apply in the case of an exempt organization's
participation in a for-profit HMO and therefore will not be discussed again
here. This section will concern itself with the rules applicable to tax exempt
HMO's.
Academic Health Centers are particularly able to establish a tax exempt
staff-, group-, or IPA-model HMO.21 The basic tax issue raised with respect
to tax exempt HMO's is first whether the HMO is operating primarily for the
private benefit of its paying members. Recall that a finding of priyate
benefit may arise when an exempt organization presumptively limits its
beneficiaries to those able to pay a membership or other fee. 2 ' Typically,
an HMO provides treatment and other health services to its enrollees or
members. Hence, the private benefit issue is implicated.
In Sound Health Association v. Commissioner,2 1 the Service denied
501(c)(3) status to a staff-model HMO ("Sound Health") and the HMO
challenged the denial before the Tax Court. According to the opinion,
Sound Health sought tax exemption as a charitable, scientific, and
educational organization.222 In addition to providing health care, Sound
Health engaged in research and educational programs relating to health
care. 23 Health care was provided by physicians and other health care
professionals actually employed by Sound Health224 and Sound Health
contracted with outside specialists and hospitals to render services it could
not provide. 2' The employed physicians received a salary and the outside
health care providers rendered services under a capitation arrangement.2
Sound Health's primary activities involved the provision of services to its
dues paying members. However, it had a program to financially assist
persons within the community who could not afford to pay the dues but
wished to be a member. 22 ' In addition, it provided health care to any person

219. For a discussion of the differences between the HMO types, see supra note 6.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
71 T.C. 158 (1978).
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. at 168-69.
Id.at 172-73.
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coming to the clinic on a fee-for- service basis and to any emergency patient
without regard to his or her ability to pay.228
The Service denied Sound Health's application for 501(c)(3) status,
consistent with its view that an organization which provided benefits
primarily to its members was not entitled to exempt status under
501(c)(3). 229 The Service also stated that the provision of insurance via the
dues requirement was an activity not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose. 2" The Tax Court disagreed, noting initially that Sound Health
provided a limited but nevertheless sufficient amount of financial assistance
to persons wishing to become members but unable to pay the membership
dues.23' In addition, the Court noted that Sound Health provided services
to any non-emergency patient able to pay under a fee-for-service
arrangement and to any emergency patient without regard to ability to
pay. 232 In essence, the Court noted, Sound Health provided more charity
care than the hospital approved in Revenue Ruling 69-545, s s and thus was
not operated for the private benefit of its financially able members. 234 The
court agreed that the collection of dues constituted the provision of
insurance and, in itself, was a commercial activity.2315 It emphasized,
though, that the test was not whether a particular activity is commercial, but
whether the activity furthered an exempt purpose.236 Since the collection
of dues furthered Sound Health's provision of health care, the insurance
character237 of the dues payment did not constitute an impermissible
activity.
Sound Health thus provides a roadmap for academic health centers
wishing to establish a tax exempt staff model HMO. A factor of primary
concern in that case was that the HMO itself provided health care services
through its staff physicians. An academic health center could easily do
likewise either by organizing its faculty practice plan(s) as staff model
HMO's which operate in the same manner as Sound Health and indeed not
much differently than present modes of operation except the creation of
dues paying memberships. Doing so would allow an academic health center
the ability to achieve the ultimate level of financial integration and to thrive
in the managed care environment from both the provider and insurer
aspects.
Suppose, however, that health center administrators seek to establish a
more contemporary group- or IPA-model HMO. Either model might be more

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.at 184.

Id.
See supra note 60.
Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 184.
Id. at 190-91.

Id.
Id.
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attractive because of the ability to maintain the present corporate structure
of a health center's faculty practice plans, or offer a wider range of physician
choices and thereby attract more enrollees. Thus, a health center might
establish an IMO which enters into contracts with the health center's
faculty practice plans and other physicians for the provision of health care
services.
In Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner(GHPI), the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals denied tax exempt status to an IPA-model HMO.23 In that case,
the HMO was organized almost identically as the HMO in Sound Health
except that it did not directly engage in educational or scientific charitable
activities. Instead the actual health care delivery, educational services, and
scientific research was rendered or conducted by health care professionals
employed by related, but nevertheless separate legal entities. 39 The HMO
merely collected dues and arranged for health care for its members from
related organizations. Thus, the Court concluded that the HMO was
operated primarily for the private benefit of its enrollees. In doing so,
however, the Court indicated how an IPA-model HMO might obtain tax
exempt status. The primary factor cited as the reason the HMO in GHP
could not achieve tax exempt status was indeed its failure to directly engage
in a charitable, scientific, or educational activity as did the HMO in Sound
Health.240 Thus, the Third Circuit's reasoning was consistent with Sound
Health's overall conclusion that an HMO which itself engages in an exempt
activity, whether it be health care delivery, education or scientific research,
may achieve tax exempt status.
An academic health center is particularly suited to meet the requirement
imposed by GHP I even when the HMO does not itself provide health care
as did the HMO in Sound Health. Health centers' tri-part basis for tax
exemption under 501(c)(3) makes the establishment of an IPA-model HMO
merely a matter of shifting functions from one department to another. Most

238. 985 F.2d 1210 (3rd Cir. 1993), afd, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994).
239. The HMO in GHP I was created by a tax exempt entity which also controlled seven
other exempt organizations which directly provided health care services. Id. at 1211; See also,
Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394, 396 (1993); Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494,496 (1994). The HMO in GHPI contracted with the other entities
to provide health care for the HMO's members. Thus, the Third Circuit described the GHPI
HMO as an IPA-model HMO. 985 F. 2d at 1218 n.4. Like the HMO in Sound Health, the HMO
in GHP I had a limited program for subsidizing the membership dues for financially needy
persons. Id. at 1213-14.
240. [T]he determination must be based upon the totality of the circumstances, with an
eye toward discerning whether the HMO in question benefits the community in
addition to its subscribers. Viewed in this light, GHP standing alone does not merit
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). GHP cannot say that it provides health
care services itself. Nor does it ensure that people who are not GHP subscribers have
access to health care or information about health care. According to the record, it
neither conducts research nor offers educational programs, much less educational
programs open to the public. It benefits no one but its subscribers.
985 F.2d at 1219.
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academic health centers have the ability to transfer all or part of its
community health educational functions, for example, to an organization
which also arranges for the provision of health care for a class of
dues-paying members via separately incorporated faculty practice plans.241
Such an HMO would therefore be directly engaged in educational or
scientific activities through its community health functions, while also
supporting the health center's larger patient access needs by contracting
with the separately incorporated faculty practice plans otherwise
unattractive to commercial HMO's. The GHP I requirement therefore does
not present a significant burden, considering health center's tri-part basis
of tax exemption, but requires a relatively insignificant shifting of functions
to the newly established HMO.
The single potential statutory barrier to a health center's establishment
of an EPA-model HIMO is I.R.C. § 501(m) which denies 501(c)(3) status to an
organization which provides "commercial type insurance" as more than a
substantial part of its activities.242 The statute provides, however, that
"commercial-type insurance" does not include "incidental health insurance
provided by a health maintenance organization of a kind customarily
'
provided by such organizations." 43
Although there are no cases yet
interpreting the provision, the legislative history clearly indicates that the
exception applies to staff-, group-, and IPA-model HMO's. 44 Thus, reading
the statute, legislation, and legislative history in conjunction with Sound
Health and GHP I, leads to the conclusion that an organization which
directly engages in an exempt activity may achieve tax exempt status and
is not engaging in an activity amounting to the provision of
"commercial-type insurance." In essence, so long as the HMO is directly

241. To be consistent with both Sound Health and GHP I, the educational activities (e.g.,
forums and lectures on health care) should be open to the public, not just dues paying
members. In addition, the HMO should have a program to subsidize the membership fees of
those who cannot afford to pay the fees themselves. This would not seem inconsistent with the
public servant type mission commonly associated with academic institutions. Curiously,
though, the Third Circuit disagreed with Sound Health's conclusion that a subsidized dues
programs resulted in community benefit. Id. at 1219-20. The Court suggested that even if an
HMO has a subsidized dues program, without more it would still benefit only its members
rather than the community at large. Id. But if the entire community is eligible for membership,
it would seem that the HMO is operated for the benefit of the entire community, notwithstanding the fact that a member of the community must take the ministerial step of applying for
membership and demonstrating an inability to pay for the membership.
242. "An organization described in paragraph (3) or (4) of [501(c)] shall be exempt from tax
under [I.R.C. § 501(a)] only if no substantial part of its activities consists of providing
commercial-type insurance." I.R.C. § 501(m) (1994).
243. I.R.C. § 501(m)(3)B) (1994).
244. The conference agreement does not alter the tax-exempt status of health
maintenance organizations (HMO's). HMO's provide physician services in a variety
of practice settings primarily through physicians who are either employees or
partners of the HMO or through contracts with individual physicians or one or more
groups of physicians (organized on a group practice or individual practice basis).
H.R. REP. No. 99-841 at 346 (1986).
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engaged in an exempt activity which benefits the community and not
simply its members, it may achieve tax exempt status. An academic health
center engaged in all facets of health care delivery, research and education
is thus particularly able to establish a tax exempt HMO.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, managed care imposes business principles designed
to decrease costs and maximize revenues to health care providers and third
party payers. Academic health center administrators, like their nonacademic counterparts, have no choice except to adapt to the managed care
4 5 In essence, the adaptation has necessitated a wholesale
environment."
the
way health centers operate. An academic health center
of
revision
seeks
to maintain its traditional operating methods incurs the
instead
which
unacceptable and unnecessary risk that the health center's.tri-part mission
will become obsolete in a cost-benefit sense. Regardless of the extent to
which the accomplishment of those missions benefit society, consumers
consider the cost too high in traditional operating methods. Health center
administrators realize and accept this fact more than anybody and thus are
implementing new structures and paradigms. In doing so, they are adopting
strategies and structures used in the nonacademic context, including
primary care physician and practice acquisitions, joint ventures, joint
operating agreements, and wholly-owned HMO's. As a result, administrators are confronting the limitations imposed by tax laws which are designed
to insure that the grant of tax exemption benefits the community at large
and does not result in counterproductive unfair competition. And yet new
strategies and structures are being implemented at a faster pace than the
pace at which tax laws are responding to the new reality, at least in terms
of providing bright-line answers. The basic tax provisions provide sufficient
guidance, but for the most part only on an expensive case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, the tax provisions summarized in this article are favorable to
academic health center efforts to continue their important missions in the
midst of the managed care environment. Barring a monumental revision to
the tangled tax code, similar to the revision of the health care system
wrought by managed care, health center administrators must therefore
understand and correctly implement the relatively archaic tax principles if
their managed care efforts are to be successful.

245. "The only way to hold on to their patient base, many universities decided, was to jump
into the managed-care business themselves." Mangan, supra note 57, at A33.

